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STATE v. JACOBS A COMMENT ON ONE STATE'S
CHOICE TO RESTRICT VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE AT
DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Jacobs,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that victim impact
testimony from the mother of a teenage murder victim about the effects of the
murder on herself and her family was admissible at the penalty phase of a capital
murder trial.2 Nevertheless, the court held that under the facts of the case, the district
court erred in admitting victim testimony during the state's case-in-chief about
magazine subscriptions sent by the defendant to the victim's mother during his
incarceration pending the trial of the matter.3 The inclusion of victim impact
evidence "briefly and narrowly presented" in capital trials was recently upheld in
New Mexico as constitutional.4 The parameters of that evidence, however, were
untested. Jacobs narrows the scope of admissible victim impact evidence while
strengthening the limiting provision of N.M. Statute Annotated Section 31-20A-
4(C)(3). 5 Moreover, Jacobs implicitly draws a bright-line between a victim's right
to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process6
and the right to make a statement to the court at sentencing7 and the defendant's
right to a sentence based upon reason rather than caprice or emotion.8
This Note will review the underlying principles and the development of modem
death penalty statutes, the historical transition of victim impact evidence through the
courts, and the role of victim impact evidence in modem death penalty decisions.
It will then examine the rationale of the Jacobs majority and arguments of the
dissent, compare their positions to existing federal and New Mexico law, and
investigate the implications of this case for capital murder sentencing in New
Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 24, 1994, eighteen-year-old Stacey Balderama's dead body was
found face down, clad in only underpants, socks, and shoes in an arroyo near Four
Hills in Albuquerque, New Mexico.9 A bicyclist discovered her body some distance
down a bicycle trail away from an abandoned green Jeep Cherokee that had
1. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 127 (2000).
2. id. at 467, 10 P.3d at 146.
3. Id
4. State v. Clark, 128 N.M. 119, 134, 990 P.2d 793, 808 (1999) (relying on Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 827 (1991)).
5. N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-20A-4(C)(3) (2000) (prohibiting the death penalty where it is imposed as a result
of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor).
6. N.M. CONsT. art. 11, § 24(A)(3) (providing the victim or victim's representative shall have "the right to
be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process").
7. Id. at § 24(A)(7) (providing the victim or a victim's representative shall have "the right to make a
statement to the court at sentencing and at any post sentencing hearing for the accused").
8. See e.g. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C)(3) (2000); See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189
(1972) (holding sentencing discretion in capital trials must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action).
9. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448,454, 10 P.3d 127, 133 (2000).
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apparently become stuck in a ditch." Earlier that day, the victim and two high
school friends had skipped classes to go to the mall, where Stacey bought a tee shirt
that depicted an eight ball on the front with a "Smile Now, Cry Later" logo on the
back and stole two identical shirts for her friends." Afterwards, the three girls made
an ill-starred decision to accept a ride offered by the driver of a green Jeep
Cherokee, Shawn Jacobs. 2 Her two friends were the last to see Stacey alive when
Jacobs dropped them off, each at their respective homes. 3 According to the Office
of the Medical Examiner (OMI), the autopsy revealed that Stacey had died as the
result of a contact gunshot wound to the back of her head that left a sooty black
granular residue on the skin and burned her hair and skin. She also suffered blunt
trauma to the head, multiple skin abrasions to her head and body, as well as vaginal
tears consistent with forced sexual penetration.' 4
During the guilt phase of the jury trial, substantial forensic and testimonial
evidence was introduced that linked Jacobs to the murder.' 5 More intriguing,
however, was the fact that Jacobs had been seen wearing the "Smile Now, Cry
Later" tee shirt and Stacey's Dallas Cowboy jacket the day after the murder.'6 A
friend of Jacobs also testified that Jacobs gave her a crucifix and a chain that the
victim was wearing on the day of the murder. 7
After the guilt phase of his trial, the jury convicted Jacobs of first degree and
felony murder, kidnapping, attempted criminal sexual penetration, armed robbery,
two counts of tampering with evidence, unlawful taking of a motor vehicle,
possession of a stolen vehicle, felon in possession of a firearm, escape from jail, and
escape from a peace officer.'"
During the penalty phase, the state presented victim impact evidence from two
witnesses. Stacey's mother, Karen Balderama, testified about her relationship with
Stacey and the effect Stacey's death had on Stacey's brother and sister.' 9 Paula
Thomas, Karen's cousin and employer, testified about Karen's struggle with the
aftermath of her daughter's death and the support she and other co-workers offered
to Karen." The state also elicited testimony about an "episode" after Jacob's arrest
and indictment while he was in custody awaiting trial. During this time, Jacobs sent
several magazine subscriptions in Stacey's name to her mother's address so it
appeared she was getting mail.2' Jacobs stipulated that the handwriting on the
subscription cards was his.22 Karen Balderama testified about receiving the
subscriptions in her daughter's name, as well as a gift subscription supposedly from
10. Id.
It. Id. at 455, 10P.3dat 134.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 455, 10 P.3d 127, 134 (2000).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 467, 10 P.3d at 146.
20. Id.
21. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448,467, 10 P.3d 127, 146 (2000).
22. Id.
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her dead daughter and the bills for the subscriptions.' She also related how
distressing it was to receive the subscriptions and how devastated she was upon
learning Jacobs was responsible.2 Paula Thomas testified about the impact of the
"episode" on the mother, remarking that Karen could not believe someone would
be so cruel to her and that later when she learned Jacobs was behind the
subscriptions, Karen asked, "Why does he keep hurting my family? Why does he
keep hurting me?"' All in all, the victim impact testimony took up seventeen pages
of trial transcript, thirteen pages from Karen Balderama and four from Paula Davis.26
Jacobs, on the other hand, presented 125 pages of mitigating testimony.27 The
evidence proffered included testimony from his grandparents, parents, step-
grandparents, and aunt who testified about poor parenting and learning disabilities.28
A witness who had known Jacobs for approximately four years prior to the murder
also testified he did not see hostility or a temper in Jacobs and that "kids make
mistakes."'29 At closing, the defense argued that Jacobs had been a "sweet little boy
who exaggerates." Counsel for the defense maintained Jacobs was "a boy who,
when he's punished, invents for himself a place where he is the king, a place where
he is the most important, where he is in charge of everything," and that "he invented
himself in response to a life of punishment and loneliness." 3o Jacob's counselor then
queried the jury whether "a killing, another death is really a fitting legacy for a
young woman's life?" Finally, the jury was told the defendant "was not beyond
redemption."3
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury found unanimously that the State
had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance of murder in
the commission of a kidnapping32 and that the aggravating circumstance outweighed
the mitigating circumstances. The jury then imposed the death penalty under the
Capital Felony Sentencing Act (hereinafter the CFSA).33 Jacobs also received an
additional sixty-nine years and six months for the other convictions,' as well as the
habitual offender 5 and firearm enhancements.36
The death sentence was automatically appealed to the New Mexico Supreme
Court.3 On appeal, Jacobs claimed six errors during the guilt phase of the trial and
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 473, 10 P.3d at 152.
27. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 473, 10 P.3d 127, 152 (2000).
28. Id.
29. id.
30. Id. at 478, 10 P.3d at 153.
31. Id.
32. Id. at469, 10 P.3d at 144.
33. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448,470, 10 P.3d 127, 145 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-1 to 6 (2000).
34. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at458, 10P.3dat 133.
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (2000).
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-16 (2000).
37. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20A-4(A) (2000) (mandating that the N.M. Supreme Court shall automatically
review ajudgement of conviction and sentence of death).
38. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 458, 10 P.3d at 133. Jacobs argued the joinder of the escape charge was improper,
potential jurors were improperly excused during voir dire, insufficient evidence of a kidnapping independent of the
attempted sexual penetration, the police lacked jurisdiction during the investigation, and he was wrongfully
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four errors during the penalty phase, including the admission of victim impact
testimony.39 The court affirmed the convictions on all counts but found the district
court had erred in admitting the victim impact evidence regarding the magazine
subscriptions during the penalty phase. Accordingly, the penalty phase was reversed
and the case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing.'
III. RATIONALE OF THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
In Jacobs, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that victim impact testimony
about the effect of the crime on the family was relevant and admissible at the
penalty phase of the trial but the family's testimony about the subscriptions was
improperly admitted because it was irrelevant and "possibly" prejudicial.4'
1. Relevancy of the Magazine Subscriptions Under Precedent
Justice Franchini, writing for the majority, noted that both State v. Allen42 and
State v. Clark4 (hereinafter Clark III) had recently held that "brief and narrowly
presented" victim impact testimony is admissible in death penalty cases." To find
constitutional authority for the admission of victim impact evidence, Clark III relied
on the holding in Payne v. Tennessee45 that the Eighth Amendment" does not
preclude victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of a death penalty case.47
Moreover, both Clark III and Allen found the admission of victim impact evidence
at sentencing was consistent with the New Mexico Constitution and that there was
statutory authority for its admission.4' The court noted, however, that in New
convicted of felon in possession of a firearm. Id.
39. Id. Jacobs contested the jury instruction, the sufficiency of the evidence for the aggravating circumstance
of murder during the commission of a kidnapping, the introduction of victim impact evidence, and the
constitutionality of and implementation of the CFSA. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 467, 10 P.3d at 146 (holding the magazine subscription testimony went beyond the scope of
admissible victim impact evidence under Payne, Clark, or the CFSA).
42. 128 N.M. 482, 994 P.2d 728 (2000).
43. 128 N.M. 119, 990P.2d793 (1999).
44. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 467, 10 P.3d at 146 (citing Allen at 504, 994 P.2d at 750, quoting Clark 111, 128
N.M. at 134, 990 P.2d at 808); Clark III held "victim impact testimony, brief in nature and narrow in scope and
purpose, is admissible under section 31-20A-1(C) as a circumstance of the crime." 128 N.M. at 136, 990 P.2d at
810. The court noted victim impact evidence was simply another way to inform the sentencing authority about the
specific harm caused by the crime in question. Id. at 134, 990 P.2d at 808.
45. 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding "that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact
evidence.. the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar").
46. U.S. CONST. amend Vlll (prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment).
47. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 467, 10 P.3d at 146.
48. Id. Clark III acknowledged that art. 11 § 24 of the N.M. Constitution, and NMSA 1978 § 31-26-4
reflected the will of the legislature and people of New Mexico. 128 N.M. at 136, 990 P.2d at 810. N.M. CoNsT. art.
I1, § 24 (effective 1992), grants victim representatives the right to make a statement to the court at sentencing and
post-sentencing hearings for the accused.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-4(G) (2000) (effective 1995) also grants victims the right to make a statement
at sentencing. Allen found the admission of victim impact evidence did not rest on the authority of the crime
victim's rights laws, however, but on Payne and sections 31-20A-1(C) and 31-20A-2(B). 128 N.M. at 504, 994 P.2d
750.
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Mexico the admissibility of victim impact evidence at sentencing is limited by the
rules of evidence governing relevance49 and the weighing of its unfair prejudicial
effect against its probative value.5"
Victim impact evidence, the court reasoned, functions to inform the sentencing
authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question. 51 "Although the
magazine subscription testimony did describe harm caused by the defendant, this
harm was not caused by the harm in question. 52 Unlike Clark III, where the
evidence was admissible because it was "additional information about the
circumstances of the crime," the court concluded the subscription testimony in
Jacobs fell outside the circumstances of the crime. It was not relevant to the crime
for which the defendant was convicted and was therefore inadmissible.53
2. Relevancy under the Scope of Section 31-20A-2(B)
The court rejected the State's argument that the evidence was allowed to come
in under section 31-20A-2(B). 54 That statute, which directs the capital sentencing
jury to "consider the defendant and the crime," the court held, does not address the
scope of the evidence to be considered. Rather, it is a balancing instruction, offered
to provide guidance on how to weigh the evidence permitted under section 31-20A-
I(C). 55
3. Relevancy to the Issue of Remorse
Similarly, the court rejected the State's argument that the evidence was probative
of the defendant's lack of remorse.56 A motion in limine prohibiting evidence that
the defendant lacked any remorse unless the defendant opened the door had been
granted by the trial court.57 Since Jacobs had not made any such claim when the
subscription testimony was offered, the evidence was inadmissible because it was
not relevant to any issue before the trial court.5' The court found this distinguishable
49. N.M. R. EVID. 11-402 (admitting all relevant evidence).
50. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 467, 10 P.3d at 146 (citing N.M. R. EVID. 11-403, which excludes relevant evidence
where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence). The court
emphasized that the Rules of Evidence requiring relevancy and an inquiry into the 403 balance test apply to
testimony and exhibits introduced at a capital sentencing trial for the purpose of victim impact. Id.
51. Id. at 468, 10 P.3d at 147 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S., 808, 825 (1991)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 467-68, 10 P.3d at 146-47. In Clark ill, the court held victim impact evidence was consistent with
the CFSA because it constituted additional evidence as to the circumstances of the crime under 31-20A-1(C) and
31-20A-2(B). 128 N.M. 119, 134, 990 P.2d 793, 808 (1999).
54. id. at 468, 10 P.3d at 147. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2(B) (2000) provides that "[ajfter weighing the
aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances, weighing them against each other, and considering
both the defendant and the crime, the jury or judge shall determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment."
55. Id. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(i)(C) (2000) provides that "[in the sentencing proceeding, all evidence
admitted at the trial shall be considered and additional evidence may be presented as to the circumstances of the
crime and as to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances pursuant to sections 6 [31-20A-5 NMSA 1978] and
7 (31-20A-6 NMSA 1978] of this acL"
56. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 468, 10P.3dat 147.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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from Allen where it had upheld the State's closing argument in rebuttal to
defendant's testimony that he was remorseful.5 9
4. Arbitrary Factors Under Section 31-20A-4(C)(3)
Section 31-20A-4(C)(3) prohibits a sentence of death if "the sentence was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.' 60
Emphasizing the "vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any
decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather
than caprice or emotion,"6' the majority concluded it had to reverse the sentencing
proceeding. 62 The court reasoned that the mere "possibility" this evidence may have
influenced the decision under an improper factor was sufficient to reverse a death
sentence.63 Since the court could not say the subscription evidence "did not bear on
any juror's decision to sentence [Jacobs] to death," the unanimous decision of the
sentencing jury was reversed."
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sema, joined by Justice Baca, concurred with the majority's opinion
except for the court's decision regarding the subscription testimony and the
influence of arbitrary factors.65
1. Relevancy of the Victim Impact Testimony
The dissent argued that the subscription testimony was relevant to the
circumstances of the crime to "show how the family was managing its grief."
'
Moreover, the subscription testimony was necessary to allow the jury to hear how
"the subscriptions as a reminder of the victim's death was the intentional
interference by defendant in the grieving process of the victim's mother.,
67
The dissent argued that in Allen courts had allowed victim impact evidence of the
family's efforts to cope with the loss caused by the victim's death,68 including
testimony about how neutral objects like coffee cups and wedding rings reminded
them of their lOSS. 69 By comparison, the magazine subscriptions were also neutral
objects that would have otherwise been admissible to show the impact of the murder
on the victim's family.70 As such, the dissent reasoned, the subscription testimony
was representative of ongoing pain and suffering resulting from the murder, a
59. Id.
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C)(3) (2000).
61. Jacobs at 468, 10 P.3d at 147 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at469, 10P.3d at 148.
66. Id. at 470, 10 P.3d at 149.
67. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 470, 10 P.3d 127, 149 (2000).
68. Id. at 469, 10 P.3d at 148 (citing State v. Allen, 128 N.M. 482, 505, 994 P.2d 728, 751 (2000)).
69. ld. at 470, 10 P.3d at 149. Here the dissent was referring to United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166,
1219-20 (10th Cir. 1998). After noting the lack of clear guidance on appropriate limits of victim impact evidence
under Payne, the court allowed the testimony of one witness about his reaction to seeing his wife's coffee cup that
read "No. 1 Mommy" and held their marriage license, two wedding rings, and a death certificate.
70. Jacobs, at 470, 10 P.3d at 149.
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reopening of an old wound, not a new harm. Accordingly, the grief caused by those
subscriptions could be properly characterized as a circumstance of the crime.7
Moreover, the dissent argued "the Supreme Court in Payne had explained the
necessity for allowing the sentencing body to hear relevant evidence regarding both
the defendant and the circumstances of the crime, including the effect of the murder
on the victim's family."72 Justice Serna contended that an intentional act and
deliberate choice to inflame the mother's pain should not be removed from the
jury's consideration of the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness as
evidence of the specific harm that he had caused." Just as a victim witness would
normally be allowed to testify to any subscription that reminded them of their loss,
a victim witness should be allowed to testify the defendant sent the subscriptions.
The "defendant... should not be permitted to remove from the jury's consideration,
the victim's mother's efforts to cope with the loss of her daughter and the obstacles
to those efforts." 74
Justice Serna concluded that undue prejudice was the constitutional standard of
review to be applied with respect to victim impact evidence under Payne. 5 In this
case, the magazine subscriptions were not so unduly prejudicial as to cause Jacobs
to have an unfair trial. 76
2. Relevancy under the Scope of Section 31-20A-2(B)
The dissent read a different construction of sections 31-20A-2(B) 7 and 31-20A-
1 (C) 71 than the majority. Justice Serna argued section 31-20A-I(C) is not the sole
source of evidence permitted under CFSA; rather, section 31-20A-2(B) authorizes
evidence of the defendant to be introduced.79 His argument was rooted in three
principles: precedent, tradition, and statutory construction.'s
First, the dissent argued that under Clark v. Tansy8 (hereinafter Clark I1), the
court had recognized that the prosecution can introduce evidence of a defendant's
future dangerousness in its case-in-chief at a capital sentencing trial even though it
71. Id.
72. Id. at 469, 10 P.3d at 148 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S., 808, 822 (1991)). The Court in Payne,
however, did not indicate the sentencer could hear any relevant evidence about the defendant. It said only that a state
could not preclude the sentencer from hearing any relevant mitigating evidence about the defendant and that it had
never held an individualized assessment of the defendant was to be considered wholly apart from the crime the
defendant had committed.
73. See Jacobs at 470, 10 P.3d at 149.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 824-25). More specifically, however, Payne reaffirmed that the Eighth
Amendment imposed special limitations on the death selection process. First the state must establish rational criteria
to impose a sentence of death. Second the state cannot limit any relevant mitigating evidence that would cause the
sentencer to decline to impose a death sentence. Beyond that, states were free to decide the substantive factors
relevant to the penalty determination, save what was so unduly prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally
unfair and in violation of the Due Process Clause.
76. Id. (citing United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1220 (10th Cir. 1998) (permitting a victim's
husband to testify that "there was a point where I actually stuck a pistol in my mouth" because of the grief he felt
at the loss of a pregnant wife)).
77. See supra note 54.
78. See supra note 55.
79. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 470, 10 P.3dat 149.
80. Id. at 470-71, 10 P.3d at 149-50.
81. 118 N.M. 486, 882 P.2d527 (1994).
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was not admissible at the guilt phase or as a circumstance of the crime or as a
statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstance.82 It reasoned that if section 31-
20A- 1 (C) were intended to limit the scope of the evidence to "circumstances of the
crime," the court's decision in Clark I had been erroneous.83 As direct proof against
this proposition, Justice Serna referred to the court's unanimous decision in Jacobs
upholding the joinder of Jacob's escape in the trial below, 4 and the court's
conclusion that evidence of escape was properly before the jury at sentencing.85
Second, Justice Sema argued that as a matter of federal law future dangerousness
was admissible in capital sentencing trials, even without express statutory
authority.8 6 Relying on Simmons v. South Carolina7 and Tuilaepa v. California,"8
the dissent concluded that the State could introduce evidence of future
dangerousness as evidence of the "defendant" under section 30-20A-2(B). 9
Simmons, the dissent reasoned, recognized that future dangerousness is allowed
during the penalty phase because it bears on all sentencing determinations, even if
the state's statutes do not mandate its consideration." Thus "the defendant's
character, prior criminal history, mental capacity, background, and age are just a few
of the many factors, in addition to future dangerousness, that a jury may consider
in fixing the appropriate punishment."9' In Tuilaepa, the court held that both a
backward-looking and forward-looking inquiry at the defendant's criminal activity
is a permissible part of the sentencing process.92
Third, Justice Sema contended that consideration of a defendant's future
dangerousness in a capital sentencing trial was consistent with the United States
Constitution. 93 To pass constitutional muster, he reasoned, a capital sentencing
scheme must perform a narrowing function, known as the selection phase, which
rests on an individualized inquiry with respect to the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty.94 Both the individualized assessment of the defendant and
circumstances of the crime are necessary to the selection phase9 5 in order for the jury
to arrive at a just and appropriate punishment.96
82. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 471, 10 P.3d at 150.
83. Id. at 470, 10 P.3d at 149. Section 31-20A-I(C) explicitly makes additional evidence under these
circumstances admissible at capital sentencing trials but is silent with respect to other non-statutory aggravating
evidence about the defendant.
84. Id. Specifically, however, what Jacobs held was that the issue of escape is always admissible at trial to
show consciousness of guilt and therefore evidence of escape would also be properly before the jury at a capital
sentencing trial.
85. Id. at 138, 10 P.3d at 136 (citing Clark 11, 118 N.M. 486, 492, 882 P.2d 527, 533 (1994) for the
proposition that future dangerousness is an appropriate consideration for capital sentencing juries so long as the
defendant has a chance for rebuttal).
86. Id. at 471, 10 P.3d at 150.
87. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
88. 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
89. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 471, 10 P.3d at 150.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Sinunons, 512 U.S. at 162-63).
92. Tuiliepa, 512 U.S. at 976.
93. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 471, 10 P.3d at 150.
94. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999)).
95. Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)) (quotations omitted).
96. Id. at 472, 10 P.3d at 151 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality
opinion), which noted individualized assessment is viewed as a progressive and humanizing development, an
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Fourth, the dissent further argued that, like traditional sentencing hearings that
allow an individualized assessment of the defendant, the trial judge should be
afforded wide discretion to permit the fullest information possible about the
defendant's life and characteristics in a capital sentencing penalty phase.97
Finally, Justice Serna asserted that, as a matter of statutory construction, section
31-20A-2(B) provided authority for the admission of the subscription testimony as
evidence about the defendant's future dangerousness at the selection phase.98
Relying on the presumption that the legislature knows about traditional
considerations when it enacts a statute" and the premise that the court had already
found section 31-20A-2(B) provided statutory authority for the admission of victim
impact evidence,'t° the dissent concluded the legislature intended relevant evidence
about the defendant to be admissible at capital sentencing trials.'0 ' In order to
effectuate this intent, they reasoned that juries must be allowed to hear evidence
about the defendant.'° 2 To hold otherwise, they concluded, would make the language
"the defendant and the crime" in section 31-20A-2(B) mere surplusage.
0 3
3. Unfair Prejudice under the New Mexico Rules of Evidence
Justice Serna predicated his final argument on the proposition that the majority
misplaced its decision on the arbitrary factors enunciated in CFSA when
admissibility of the subscription evidence should have been more appropriately
addressed under the Rules of Evidence.' 0" Under Rule 11-403, the trial judge is
given wide discretion to decide whether the probative value of the evidence
substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice and will be reversed only on
a showing of abuse of discretion.'05
Accordingly, the dissent found that discretion was not abused. While conceding
that the evidence was prejudicial, the dissent nonetheless argued it was admissible
because it had significant probative value. '" First, the evidence was probative of
future dangerousness. °7 The subscriptions could show how Jacobs took pleasure in
inflicting pain associated with his crime and a jury could therefore infer an increased
likelihood he would be dangerous in the future.'
enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 472, 10 P.3d at 151.
99. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 471, 10 P.3d 127, 150 (2000).
100. Id. (citing State v. Allen, 128 N.M. 482, 504,994 P.2d 728,755 (2000)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 472, 10 P.3d at 151.
103. Id. Section 31-20(A)-2(B) requires the sentencer to determine the sentence after weighing the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances and considering both the defendant and the crime. Justice Sema argues that by
construing the statute so as not to allow additional aggravating evidence about the defendant would make the
phraseology redundant.
104. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 473, 10 P.3d at 152 (citing Allen at 504-05, 994 P.2d at 750-51, which emphasized
that the Rules of Evidence requiring relevance and the balancing of unfair prejudice apply to the use of victim
impact evidence at capital sentencing trials).
105. id. (citing State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 726, 819 P.2d 673, 676 (1991) (holding that the court
has great discretion in applying Rule 11-403)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Second, the State was entitled to rebut the defendant's character evidence,
introduced by the defense throughout 125 pages of transcript testimony in which the
defendant inferred he was not morally culpable by placing the blame for his actions
on his family and upbringing.'0 9 The subscription testimony revealed Jacobs's moral
culpability and how he continued to inflict pain and suffering associated with the
murder." 0 Therefore the testimony was admissible to rebut the claim that Jacobs was
a "sweet little boy" and put it in its proper context."
Third, the subscription testimony was properly allowed to rebut the defendant's
inference that he was amenable to rehabilitation."' The dissent reasoned Jacobs was
trying to invoke this mitigating circumstance when the defense presented testimony,
and later argued, that Jacobs was not beyond redemption. Rather, he was once a
sweet boy that had invented himself in response to a life of punishment and
loneliness.13 In fact, the defense argued that his actions as recently as four years
before had been those of a young man seeking redemption." 4
Accordingly, Justices Sema and Baca concluded the subscription testimony was
admissible because the potential for unfair prejudice was substantially outweighed
by what they viewed as the considerable probative value of the victim impact
testimony.'' 5
IV. HISTORICAL AND CONTEXUAL BACKGROUND
Historically, the constitutionality of the death penalty has been a hotly contested
issue that has divided both federal and state courts, perhaps more than any other area
of the law."6 Victim impact evidence has only added fuel to that fire and sharpened
the division within the courts. ' To understand the debate surrounding the use of
victim impact evidence in capital sentencing trials and put the Jacobs decision in its
proper perspective, this part will review the history and underlying constitutional
principles of modem death penalty jurisprudence. It will then explore the parallel
development of this law in New Mexico, as well as the more recent introduction of
victim impact evidence in capital trials. The purpose of this section is to lay the
groundwork for understanding Jacobs and its significance for New Mexico, as well
as to help clarify what is admissible or inadmissible evidence at capital sentencing
in New Mexico.
109. Id. (comparing the seventeen pages of victim impact testimony introduced by the State's two witnesses).
110. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448,473, 10 P.2d 127, 152 (2000).
111. Id. at474, 10 P.3d at 153.
112. Id. at 474, 10 P.3d at 153. The possibility of rehabilitation is admissible as a mitigating circumstance
under section 31-20A-6(G).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. id. (citing State v. Rojo, 126 N.M. 438, 451,971 P.2d 829, 842). The court in Rojo found the fact that
some jurors might find evidence of a defendant's prior acts toward the victim offensive or inflammatory did not
necessarily require its exclusion under the rule 11-403 balance test.
116. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the
Court, 100 HARv. L REV. 313 (1986); Weisburg, Deregulating Death, 1983 S. CT. REV. 305.
117. See e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41
B.C. L REV. 517 (May 2000).
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A. Constitutional Principles of Modern Federal Death Penalty Jurisprudence
From the time the United States declared its independence, it rebelled against the
common law system of mandatory death sentences inherited from England.'
Initially legislatures attempted to identify and categorize the various forms of
criminal homicide for which a person should die. In response to the growing
problem of jury nullification inherent to a system of mandatory death sentences,
legislatures adopted methods of granting jury discretion, which eventually gave way
to a system of absolute, "untrammeled discretion" in the imposition of the death
penalty." 9 As late as 1971, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that
complete discretion in imposing the death penalty violated the fundamental standard
of fairness underlying the Fourteenth Amendment due process.' 2 The following
year, this standard changed abruptly in Furman v. Georgia.121
"Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards for a
constitutional death penalty that would serve both goals of measured, consistent
application and fairness to the accused."' 22 Furman held the death penalty that had
been imposed in the cases under the Court's review constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.'23 Moreover, it mandated that
"where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion
must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action.""2
Two fundamental, yet somewhat conflicting, concepts in modern capital
punishment jurisprudence were established by the Supreme Court following
Furman. In 1976, the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia upheld the
118. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1972); See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111
(1981).
119. Furman, 408 U.S. at247.
120. People v. McGautha, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971). The-ourt went on to note that
in light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite
impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to
pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. The States
are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing
death for a fellow human will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will
consider a variety of factors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence or by the
arguments of defense counsel. For a court to attempt to catalogue the appropriate factors in this
elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of
circumstances would ever be really complete. The infinite variety of cases and facets to each
case would make general standards either meaningless "boiler-plate" or a statement of the
obvious that no jury would need.
121. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
122. Eddings, 455 U.S. at l1l.
123. The cases under review included two rape cases, one from Georgia and one from Texas, as well as a
murder that occurred in Georgia. In a per curium opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall found the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the death penalty altogether. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305, 370. Three justices found
discretionary sentencing that lacked legislative standards violated the Eighth Amendment because it was "pregnant
with discrimination," Id at 257 (Douglas, J. concurring), and because it permitted the death penalty to be
"wantonly" and "freakishly" imposed, Id. at 310 (Stewart, J. concurring), and because it imposed the death penalty
with "great infrequency" and afforded "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases from the many cases
in which it was not," Id. at 313 (White, J. concurring).
124. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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constitutionality of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.' 25 In a joint
opinion, the Court explicitly rejected absolute sentencing discretion in death penalty
cases because of the substantial risk it created that the death penalty would be
imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.' 26 Three Justices held that sentencing
discretion must be "directed and limited," by an objective standard to guide,
regulate, and make rationally reviewable the imposition of a death sentence.1
27
In Gregg, the Court also upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia death penalty
statute 2 ' that retained the death penalty for murder and five other crimes.' 29 The
statute set forth guidelines for a bifurcated trial process whereby guilt was
determined in the first stage. 30 In the second stage, the jury was permitted to hear
additional aggravating or mitigating evidence. At least one of ten enumerated
aggravating circumstances had to be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt for
a jury to impose a sentence of death.' By law, the decision was then automatically
appealed to the state's supreme court to determine if the sentence was influenced by
passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor.3 2 Under the Georgia statute, the
Georgia Supreme Court also reviewed whether the evidence supported a finding of
statutory aggravation and whether, "considering both the defendant and the crime,"
the sentence was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed. 33
That same year, in Woodson v. North Carolina,4 the Supreme Court struck down
the constitutionality of mandatory death penalty statutes in a vote of five to four.'
3 5
The Woodson majority emphasized that underlying the Eighth Amendment was an
"enlightened policy" of fundamental respect for humanity.3 That policy required
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular crime as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of imposing the penalty of death. 1
37
A process that accords no significance to the relevant facts of the character and
record of the individual offender or circumstance of the crime excludes from
125. Id. at 186-87. The Court observed that there are two aspects to the inquiry into excessiveness under the
Eighth Amendment. First, whether punishment makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; and
second, whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. The Court held the
imposition of the death penalty was neither.
126. Id. at 188.
127. Id. at 189.
128. Id. at 207. Including Gregg, the Court considered five post-Furman death penalty statutes in 1976. The
court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia, Florida, and Texas statutes in Gregg, Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976) and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), respectively. It struck down North Carolina and Louisiana
statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
129. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162.
130. Id. at 163.
131. Id. at 163-66.
132. Id. at 166.
133. Id. at 167.
134. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
135. Id. at 305 (holding that mandatory death sentences that leave neither judge nor jury discretion to impose
a lesser sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.). Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Stephens, wrote
for the majority. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred, while Justices White, Burger, Rehnquist, and Blackmun
dissented.
136. Id. at 304.
137. Id.
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consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from diverse frailties of
humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as
uniquely individual human beings but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the death penalty.138
The second fundamental principle in modem death penalty jurisprudence evolved
from Woodson but was clarified by the Court in Lockett v. Ohio. 39 Even though
discretion of the sentencing authority is restricted, a defendant must be allowed to
introduce any relevant mitigating evidence regarding his character or record and any
circumstance of his crime. In Lockett, the Court recognized the historical acceptance
and necessity of individualized sentencing in all criminal cases.' 4 Moreover, it
noted that a sentence of death called for a greater degree of reliability.' 4 ' The
"degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than
in non-capital cases... [because of] the nonavailability of corrective or modifying
mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence.'
' 42
Although the Woodson court invalidated a death penalty statute because it did not
permit an individualized assessment of the defendant, it had not considered what
aspects of an offender or his offense it deemed relevant in capital sentencing and
what degree of consideration it would require under the Constitution. 4 3 Faced with
those questions, the Lockett court held that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the
rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.'"
Several post-Lockett decisions have expanded the "Lockett Rule." In Eddings v.
Oklahoma the Court held, "the sentencer may not refuse to consider, as a matter of
law, any relevant mitigating evidence."'4 5 Hitchcock v. Dugger reaffirmed these
holdings and reversed a sentence of death where the jury was instructed not to
consider evidence of non-statutory mitigating factors.'" Even evidence that "the
defendant would not pose a danger if spared" has been held potentially mitigating
evidence that may not be excluded from the sentencing authority's consideration. 
47
138. Id. at 303-04 (emphasis added).
139. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
140. Id. at 602-03.
141. Id. at 604.
142. Id. at 605.
143. Id. at 604.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1981). In sentencing a sixteen-year-old boy to death, the judge had refused, as a
matter of law, to consider the defendant's troubled family history, abusive father, and emotional disturbance.
146. 481 U.S. 393, 398 (1986).
147. 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (holding that the exclusion of evidence proffered by the defendant at sentencing
regarding his good behavior during the seven months he spent in jail awaiting trial violated defendant's right to offer
evidence in mitigation of punishment). Id. at 4.
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B. New Mexico Death Penalty Statutes and Jurisprudence
In 1973, in response to Furman, New Mexico, like other states, enacted a
mandatory death penalty statute in order to withdraw all discretion for imposing the
penalty of death from the jury, thereby completely withdrawing the potential for any
arbitrariness. 48 Three years later, however, in response to Woodson, which struck
down mandatory death penalties because the North Carolina law did not permit
consideration of mitigating factors about the defendant, New Mexico followed suit,
striking down its own mandatory death statute as unconstitutional in State v.
Rondeau.149 There the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that "a legislative
enactment imposing automatic death was an impermissible response in light of
today's societal values and had been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably
rigid."'
150
Following the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Gregg and Lockett,
the New Mexico Legislature enacted our current death penalty law in 1979.'15 This
statute was modeled after similar laws in Georgia, Florida, and Texas that had been
upheld as constitutional.' 52
The result was a capital sentencing scheme in New Mexico that is actually a
three-part process. 53 During the "guilt phase," the fact-finder determines guilt or
innocence without any consideration of punishment. If a guilty verdict is entered,
the trial enters the "penalty phase." This phase consists of a two-part sentencing
hearing. During the "eligibility phase," the jury must find one of the seven
enumerated aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Once these
determinations are made, the trial enters the "selection phase," in which the jury is
instructed to "weigh the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances
and consider the defendant and the crime charged" in determining whether to
impose death or life imprisonment. 5 4 During the selection phase the sentencing
authority may consider all evidence admitted at trial, as well as additional evidence
as to the circumstances of the crime and any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances enumerated in the act.'55
148. State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 411-12, 553 P.2d 688, 692 (1976) This case actually invalidated New
Mexico's mandatory death penalty statute as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In doing
so, the court noted, "The amendment to New Mexico's death penalty statute in 1973 imposing mandatory death
sentences was the Legislature's response to the admonition of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), to remove
the element of capriciousness which was present when the jury had unlimited discretion in determining the
application of the death penalty." In light of that decision, the court also held imposition of the death penalty is not
per se unconstitutional under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.
149. Id. at 412, 553 P.2d at 692 (finding the New Mexico statute imposed mandatory death penalty with no
alternative to mitigate).
150. Id.
151. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-1-6 (2000).
152. According to State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 777, 664 P.2d 969, 975 (1983), the New Mexico CFSA
mirrored Georgia's statute, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2534.1 & 27-2537 (Cum. Supp. 1982) that was upheld in Gregg,
as well as FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1981) that was upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 428, U.S. 241 (1976), and TEXAS
STAT. ANN. art. 37-071 (Vernon 1981) that was upheld in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). As noted below,
however, there are explicit differences between these statutes and the CFSA.
153. See Garcia, 99 N.M. at 777-78, 664 P.2d. at 975-76.
154. Id. at 778, 664 P.2d at 976.
155. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1(C) (2000).
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An automatic and complete appellate review to the New Mexico Supreme Court
follows. By law, a death sentence must be reversed if (1) the evidence does not
support a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance; (2) the
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances; (3) the sentence
was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
or (4) the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases.156
Expanding on the principles set forth in Gregg, Lockett, and their progeny, the
New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Garcia affirmed the constitutionality of the
death penalty under the New Mexico and United States constitutions, as well as New
Mexico's capital punishment statutes." 7 The court found the CFSA and the
corresponding jury instructions'" were constitutional, despite the fact that the
aggravating circumstances 59 were limited to enumerated circumstances while the
enumerated mitigating circumstancesW were expressly non-exclusive. 6'
Specifically, the court upheld N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.33, which instructs juries, in
deciding whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or death, to weigh the
enumerated aggravating circumstances against any mitigating circumstances and to
consider both the defendant and the crime. 62 Rejecting defendant's argument that
mitigating factors needed to be clear and objective, the court adopted the principles
of Lockett163 and Eddings'" that not only permitted a defendant to introduce any
evidence in mitigation of a sentence of death, but also required the judge or jury to
consider such evidence. In "considering both the defendant and the crime," the court
held that the jury was required to use a subjective standard of review, taking into
account individualized considerations of the person, as well as the circumstances of
the crime.'65
In his concurring opinion, Justice Sosa argued the CFSA was unconstitutional. 66
Among other things, he attacked the validity of U.J.I. 39.33 because it did not define
"mitigating circumstances" and failed to provide any objective guidance for the jury
156. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C)(3) (2000).
157. Garcia, 99 N.M. at 777, 664 P.2d at 975.
158. These instructions have been renumbered N.M. U.J.I CRiM. 14-7026 and 14-7030, respectively, but
remain the same contextually. 14-7026 places the burden on the state to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one
or more of the aggravating circumstances is present." 14-7030 requires that "after weighing the aggravating
circumstances and the mitigating circumstances, weighing them both against each other, and considering both the
defendant and the crime, [the sentencing authority] shall determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment."
159. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 (2000) enumerates seven aggravating circumstances that include murder
(1) of an on duty police officer, (2) with intent to kill during a kidnapping, criminal sexual contact of a minor or
criminal sexual penetration, (3) during an escape, (4) of an inmate, (5) of a corrections department employee, (6)
for hire, and (7) of a witness or anyone likely to become a witness to prevent that person from testifying.
160. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6 (2000) includes nine mitigating circumstances: no significant history of
prior criminal activity, duress, capacity, mental or emotional disturbance, victim was willing participant, excuse or
justification, probability of rehabilitation, cooperation with authorities, and age.
161. Garcia, 99 N.M. at 779, 664 P.2d at 977.
162. See supra note 158. N.M. U.J.1. CRIM. 39.33 was renumbered N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-7030.
163. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
164. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
165. Garcia, 99 N.M. at 779, 664 P.2d at 977.
166. Id. at 782, 664 P.2d at 980.
Summer 2001]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
as to the meaning of "considering both the defendant and the crime."'67 Justice Sosa
argued a jury should be instructed that only enumerated aggravating circumstances
were to be considered and that a jury could only consider "the defendant and the
crime" in mitigation of a defendant's sentence.16
At least part of the controversy in Garcia focused on the meaning of section 31-
20A-2(B). It stands to reason that the court in Garcia resisted an attempt to define
and thus limit mitigating factors to "the defendant and the crime." Instead it
recognized that under federal law the sentencing authority could not only be
precluded from hearing but was required to consider any relevant mitigating
evidence about the defendant. 69 What was required, the court held, was a subjective,
individualized assessment of the defendant in mitigation of a sentence of death.17
0
The CFSA was enacted under that principle, as well as the Gregg principle that
discretion had to be limited and directed in selecting a death-eligible defendant.'7 '
Because the court refused to provide guidance over the meaning of "considering
both the defendant and the crime" in Garcia, however, the question of whether the
jury can consider other than mitigating evidence when it considers "the defendant
and the crime" has remained unsettled.
72
The court revisited this issue the following year in State v. Guzman.173 There the
court rejected defendant's argument that U.J.I. Crim. 39.33, "considering both the
defendant and the crime," allowed the jury to consider the defendant and the crime
as a non-statutory aggravating factor and was therefore arbitrary and
unconstitutional. 74 The court held "U.J.I. Crim. 39.33 [did] not allow the
consideration of any non-statutory aggravating circumstances. U.J.I. Crim. 39.33
relate[d] to a weighing process, not to the threshold determination of whether an
aggravating circumstance exists.' 75 Accordingly, the instruction was held
constitutional because it allowed for a non-arbitrary imposition of the death penalty
that was rationally reviewable.
76
One could conclude, at least up through early 1980, that modem death penalty
jurisprudence, both federal and in New Mexico, was grounded upon principles of
rational decision making free from arbitrary factors"7 along with the humanization
and corresponding individualized assessment of the defendant in mitigation of a
167. Id. at 783, 664 P.2d at 981.
168. See id. at 783, 664 P.2d at 981.
169. See Lockett, 438 U.S. 586; Eddings, 455 U.S. 104.
170. See Lockett, 438 U.S. 586; Eddings, 455 U.S. 104.
171. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
172. This is the essence of the argument in Jacobs. It appears that in Justice Franchini's view, the only
aggravating factors the jury may consider are enumerated in the CFSA unless, as discussed below, the evidence
relates to a "circumstance of the crime," was admitted at trial or to prove a statutory aggravating circumstance at
sentencing, or rebuts mitigating evidence proffered by the defense. In Justice Serna's view, "defendant and the
crime" should be broadly interpreted to include any relevant information about the defendant, including non-
statutory aggravating factors such as future dangerousness, prior criminal history, or the likelihood of rehabilitation.
173. 100 N.M. 756, 676 P.2d 1321 (1984).
174. Id. at 759-60, 676 P.2d at 1324-25.
175. Id. at 760, 676 P.2d at 1325.
176. See id. (referring to Garcia and reaffirming that there was no fault in the instruction).
177. See supra notes 127, 152 and accompanying text.
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sentence of death.' In fact, these principles were regarded as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of imposing the death penalty. 179
C. The Rise of the Victim's Rights Movement
Nonetheless, the jurisprudence that had come to demand a humanization of the
defendant and assurances of a rational process remained fraught by the same tension
that had split the Court over whether the death penalty was constitutional at all. This
fundamental division within the Court has intensified and been further confused by
the corresponding rise in the victim rights movement, especially in the past two
decades, ° with the subsequent interjection of victim impact evidence into the
capital sentencing process."' Justice Scalia, writing in favor of the use of victim
impact evidence at capital sentencing trials, wrote,
[V]ictims' rights-a phrase that describes what its proponents feel is the failure
of courts to take into account in their sentencing decisions not only the factors
mitigating the defendant's moral guilt, but also the amount of harm he has
caused to innocent members of society. Many citizens have found one-sided and
hence unjust the criminal trial in which a parade of witnesses comes forth to
testify to the pressures beyond normal human experiences that drove the
defendant to commit his crime, with no one to lay before the sentencing
authority the full reality of human suffering the defendant has produced-
which... is one of the reasons society deems his act worthy of the prescribed
penalty.' 82
Justice Stevens, perhaps, best articulated the flip side to this argument:
[Justice Scalia's] view that the exclusion of evidence about a crime's anticipated
consequences significantly harms our criminal justice system, rests on the
untenable premise that the strength of the system is to be measured by the
number of deaths that may be returned on the basis of such evidence. Because
the word "arbitrary" is not to be found in the constitutional text, he apparently
can find no reason to object to the arbitrary imposition of capital punishment.'83
Two threshold United States Supreme Court cases mark the era of victim impact
evidence in capital sentencing trials and delineate the respective views of the Court.
In 1987, the Court considered a Maryland law that required a victim impact
statement in the pre-sentence report describing the defendant's background,
178. See supra notes 144, 170 and accompanying text.
179. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304(1976).
180. See e.g., Rachel King, Why a Victim's Rights Constitutional Amendment Is a Bad Idea: Practical
Experiences from Crime Victims, 68 U. CIN. L REv. 357 (2000); see also, Beth E. Sullivan, Note, Harnessing
Payne: Controlling the Admission of Victim Impact Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearings from
Passion and Prejudice, 25 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 601, 601 and n.35 (1998); Karen L. Kennard, Comment, The
Victims' Veto: A Way to Increase Victim Impact on Criminal Case Dispositions, 77 CAL. L REv. 417, 422-24
(1989).
181. See Logan, supra note 117.
182. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,520 (1987) (Scalia, J. with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and O'Connor joined, dissenting.).
183. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 859 (1991) (Stevens, J., with whom Justice Blackmun joined,
dissenting).
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education, employment history, and criminal record in Booth v. Maryland."8 4 Two
men bound and gagged an elderly couple in their home during a burglary and
repeatedly stabbed them in the chest with a kitchen knife. They were found two days
later by their son.' 5 At defendant's capital sentencing trial, a victim impact
statement from the victim's son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter was read
to the jury. It emphasized the victims' outstanding personal qualities and noted how
deeply they would be missed, as well as the personal problems the family had faced
as a result of the crime.' 6 The daughter expressed her view that she could never
forgive the defendant and that he could never be rehabilitated. In the son's view, his
parents had been "butchered like animals."'8 7
Pursuant to protocol, the Court split. s88 In a five-to-four decision, the majority
held that except to the extent that victim impact evidence related directly to the
circumstances of the crime, such evidence at a capital sentencing trial violated the
Eighth Amendment.' 9 The majority reasoned that victim impact evidence was
irrelevant to a decision to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment and also
created a constitutionally unacceptable risk that a jury might impose the death
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner.'"
Premising their decision on the principle that "death is a punishment different
from all other sanctions,"' 9 ' the Court recognized that although thirty-six states
permitted victim impact statements in some contexts, 92 capital trials must be
"suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action."' 93 Accordingly, an individualized assessment based on the
defendant's record and characteristics and the circumstances of the crime must
underlie the sentencing decision.'" Moreover, the evidence must have some bearing
on the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt."'t95 Therefore, the
sentencing jury must focus on the defendant as a "uniquely individual human
being," not on the victim and the effect of the crime on the family, which are
unrelated to a defendant's blameworthiness'" and circumstances unbeknownst to
the defendant, making them irrelevant to his decision to kill. '17 The Court succinctly
stated, "[a] defendant's level of culpability depends not on the fortuitous
circumstances such as the composition of the victim's family but on circumstances
over which he has control."' 98
184. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498.
185. Id. at 497-98.
186. Id. at 499.
187. Id. at 500.
188. Justice Powell delivered the opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
Chief Justice Rehnqist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and White dissented.
189. Booth, 482 U.S. at 503.
190. Id. at 505.
191. Id. at 509, n.12 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 502 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., 153, 189 (1976)).
194. Id.
195. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (quoting Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
196. Id
197. Id. at 504-05.
198. id. at 505, n.7.
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The Court noted that Booth presented two categories of victim impact evidence.
"Type I" included the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional
impact of the crime on the family.'99 The majority found that this type of victim
impact evidence was unrelated to blameworthiness because the focus of victim
impact evidence is on the victim's reputation and character and the effect of the
murder on the family rather than on the defendant. 2°° "[A] defendant's level of
culpability depends not on fortuitous circumstances such as the composition of his
victim's family but on circumstances over which he has control."' Moreover, this
type of information introduced an arbitrary factor into the sentencing decision so
that a decision whether to execute a person might turn on the victim's character or
the family's willingness and ability to articulate their grief.20 2 A defendant whose
victim was an upstanding citizen, for instance, might be considered more deserving
of punishment than a defendant with a less worthy victim."
"Type II" victim impact evidence was the opinion testimony about the defendant
or the appropriate sentence, such as the son's testimony that his parents were
"butchered like animals" or the daughter's testimony that "animals wouldn't do
that," which showed that the defendant was vicious and that he could never be
rehabilitated.2" The Court held that this type of testimony only served to inflame the
jury and divert the decision away from relevant evidence concerning the crime and
the defendant, thereby violating the principle that a sentence "be and appear to be
based on reason, rather than caprice or emotion.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Scalia, argued that the family as well as the community is
impacted by brutal murders.' Therefore, appropriate sentencing considerations are
policy decisions and in a democratic society it is the legislature, not the court, that
responds to the will and moral values of the people.20 7 A decision to hold the
defendant accountable for the entire harm he has caused the victim's family and
society is not improper' 8 The state also had a legitimate interest in counteracting
any mitigating evidence the defendant is entitled to present. 209 Moreover, they
countered, any arbitrariness stemming from the victim or articulation of the impact
on the family was no different than differences inherent in the trial process, such as
the differences between counsels' abilities and other witnesses.2 °
199. Id. at 504.
200. Id.
201. Booth b. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,505 n.7 (1987).
202. Id. at 505.
203. Id. at 506, n.8.
204. Id. at 508.
205. Id. (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1978)).
206. Id. at 515.
207. Booth v. Maryland, 428 U.S. 496, 515 (1987). Recall this was a case striking down a Maryland statute
that required victim impact statements. In fact, the majority recognized that thirty-six states had enacted similar
legislation.
208. Id.
209. Id. at517.
210. Id. at517-18.
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Two years later, Booth was extended to include arguments made by prosecutors
in capital sentencing trials in South Carolina v. Gathers.2 ' There the Court held
prosecutors could not make statements regarding the personal qualities of the
victims in their arguments to the jury.2"2 Only four years after Booth, the Court's
composition changed and Payne v. Tennessee"3 overruled Booth and Gathers."
1 4
This time the dissenters were in the majority." 5 The Court held the Eighth
Amendment did not erect a per se bar to victim impact evidence 16 and found "no
reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated."2 7
Accordingly the decision as to whether evidence about the victim and the impact of
the murder on the victim's family was relevant to a capital sentencing decision was
left to the states.18
In Payne, the victim impact evidence involved the 'Type I" category described
in Booth. The case involved the brutal stabbing death of a young mother and her
two-year old daughter, and the near death of her three-year old son who also
witnessed the horrific demise of his mother and sister.2 9 His grandmother testified
at trial that the boy cried for his mom and sister, missed them terribly, and didn't
understand why they weren't coming home.2 °
The Court in Payne, however, expressly withheld any comment on the "Type I"
victim impact evidence that included characterizations and opinions about the
defendant or the crime since that evidence was never present in the case.22' Payne's
holding is therefore limited to the admissibility of evidence relating to the victim
and victim impact evidence,222 while "Type II" evidence remains inadmissible under
Booth.
The Payne majority reiterated their earlier dissenting arguments from Booth,
rejecting the premises of Booth and Gathers that evidence relating to a particular
victim or harm caused to the victim's family does not reflect a defendant's
blameworthiness, which is the only evidence relevant in a capital sentencing
decision.2' The Court reasoned that an important concern of criminal law in
determining an appropriate punishment is the assessment of the harm caused by a
defendant.24 Given the virtually unlimited introduction of mitigating evidence for
the defendant, the State should not be barred from offering a "quick glimpse into the
211. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
212. Id. at 811.
213. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
214. Id. at 830.
215. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White
and Kennedy, wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Souter gave a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy.
Justices Marshall and Stevens filed dissenting opinions, each were joined by Justice Blackmun.
216. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 827.
219. Id. at812.
220. Id. at 814-15.
221. Id.
222. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830, n.2 (1991).
223. Id. at819.
224. Id. at 820. The court illustrated this point by posing the example of a robber who pulls a trigger and kills
may get the death penalty, whereas a robber whose gun misfires and kills a guard will not. One defendant is more
blameworthy than the other defendant.
[Vol. 31
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
life defendant chose to extinguish." 225 Even though the Court required the defendant
to be treated, as a "uniquely individual human," it never intended that individualized
consideration be made wholly apart from the crime committed.226 Victim impact
evidence, the majority contended, was not offered to compare victims in order to
show some defendants were more deserving to die; rather, it was offered to show
"each victim's uniqueness as an individual human being."'227
The Court argued, moreover, that the rational criteria established by the states,
which included a nearly unrestrained consideration of mitigating circumstances
weighed against specific aggravating circumstances, was all that was required under
the Eighth Amendment. 228 Beyond that the states were free to choose substantive
factors relevant to the penalty determination. 229 As such, the Court viewed victim
impact evidence as simply another method of informing the sentencing authority
about the specific harm caused by the defendant's crime230 that the jury is free to
weigh along with contrary evidence.23' In the majority's view, the Fourteenth
Amendment due process requirement was a sufficient check against any undue
prejudice that might arise as a result of this evidence.232
The dissenters in Payne also reiterated their opinions from Booth, re-emphasizing
the "core principle" of capital jurisprudence; that the sentence must reflect an
individualized assessment of the defendant's personal responsibility and moral
guilt.233 This assessment, they reasoned, must be based on factors that channel the
jury's discretion so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action.23 Victim impact evidence, it was argued, damaged both.235 Rather than
shedding light on the defendant's guilt or moral culpability, victim impact evidence
served no other purpose than to encourage a decision based on emotion rather than
reason.3 6 As such, the dissent argued, not only was victim impact evidence
arbitrary, it was "constitutionally irrelevant;"'237 a "classic non-sequitur: The victim
is not on trial; her character, whether good or bad, cannot therefore constitute either
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance."" 8
Payne represented a shift in focus from the humanization of the defendant, which
was deemed essential to the enlightened policy of a humane society in consideration
of sentencing one of its members to death, to the humanization of the victim as a
unique human being. In her concurring opinion in Payne, Justice O'Connor noted
that "[m]urder is the ultimate act of depersonalization. It transforms a living person
with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special
225. Id. at 822.
226. Id.
227. id.
228. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 825.
231. Id. at 822.
232. Id. at 825.
233. Id. at 845 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
234. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 845 (1991).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 858.
238. Id. at 859.
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and unique about the person. The Constitution does not preclude the State from
deciding to give some of that back." 239 This seems to summarize the core principle
of the victim's rights movement.
Subsequent to Payne, and riding on the tide of the victim's rights movement, the
people of New Mexico ratified a Victim's Bill of Rights Amendment to their State
Constitution by a vote of 324,509 for and 148,419 against.24° The amendment
provides in relevant part that in the case of murder, a victim's representative shall
have "the right to make a statement to the court at sentencing and at any post-
sentencing hearing for the accused."24
The amendment's enacting legislation, the Victims of Crime Act, which was
passed in 1994, became effective in 1995.242 The stated purpose of the new statute
was to assure that
A. the full impact of the crime is brought to the attention of the court;
B. the victims of violent crimes are treated with dignity, respect, and sensitivity
at all stages of the criminal justice process;
C. victim's rights are protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors,
judges as vigorously as are the right of the criminal defendant's; and
D. the provisions of Article 2, Section 24 are implemented in the statute.
2 ' 3
In 1989, in the interim between Booth and Payne, New Mexico adopted Booth,
in State v. Clark" (hereinafter Clark 1). There the court found, however, that the
testimony of the nine-year-old victim's mother about her efforts to locate her
daughter after the murder was evidence "related directly to the circumstance of the
crime" that was admissible under Booth,245 as well as section 31-20A-1(C).
216
Furthermore, the court noted that the testimony was brief and unemotional. 247
When the issue arose again ten years later, however, the New Mexico Supreme
Court chose to follow Payne in the third-go-round of Clarke4 8 (hereinafter Clark II1)
holding, "victim impact evidence, brief and narrowly presented, is admissible during
the penalty phase of death penalty cases." 9 The court reaffirmed its findings in
Clark I that the mother's testimony describing the last time she saw her daughter,
what she was thinking while she waited for her to return, and how she was
239. Id at 832.
240. See N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24. Proposed by S.J.R. No. 4 (Laws 1992), the amendment to art. 1I, § 24 was
adopted on November 3, 1992.
241. N.M. CONST. art 11, § 24(A)(7). This section lists fifteen crimes to which the Victim's Rights
Amendment applies.
242. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-26-1 to 31-26-14 (2000).
243. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-26-2 (2000).
244. 108 N.M. 288, 298, 772 P.2d 322, 332 (1989) (accepting the proposition that a death sentence must be
reviewed in light of Booth).
245. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507, n. 10 (noting that evidence may be admissible if'it relates directly
to the circumstance of the crime).
246. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-I(C) (2000). As noted above, this statute permits the capital sentencing jury
to hear additional evidence about the "circumstance of the crime." See also Clark 1, 108 N.M. at 298-99, 772 P.2d
at 332-33.
247. Id. at 299, 772 P.2d at 333.
248. 128 N.M. 119, 134, 990 P.2d 793, 808 (noting that although the court was bound by Booth in Clark !,
states were "now" free to admit or restrict victim impact evidence under Payne, on the grounds such evidence, "brief
and narrowly presented," does not violate either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments).
249. Id.
(Vol. 31
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
* fingerprinted but never seen again was not victim impact evidence. It found that
testimony that was admissible under section 31-20A-1 (C) was relevant to prove the
aggravating circumstance of kidnapping, and it was directly related to the
circumstance of the crime.250 On the other hand, the mother's testimony that she
would never know what it was like to raise a daughter or enjoy activities with her
was victim impact evidence permitted under Payne.25'
Justice Serna, writing for a unanimous court in Clark 111,252 reasoned that under
the plain language of the 1992 Amendment" and the Victims of Crime Act254 a
victim or victim representative was permitted to make a statement to "the court. 2 5
That authority, he concluded, included a victim representative's statement to the
jury, as the sentencing authority in death penalty cases. 6 Moreover, the court
assumed the legislature was aware of Payne when it enacted the Act.257 The court
also recognized that "31-20A- 1(C) permit[ted] the jury to hear additional evidence
as to the circumstance of the crime," and that "31-20A-2(B) charge[d] the jury to
consider the crime in order to decide the appropriate punishment."a 8 Moreover, the
victim impact evidence in Clark I1 was not any more inflammatory than the simple
fact of kidnapping a nine-year-old child and shooting her in the head. 9 Therefore,
it held "victim impact testimony, brief in nature and narrow in scope and purpose,
is admissible under section 31-20A-1(C), as a circumstance of the crime. ' ' "w
Coincidentally, the second case in New Mexico to discuss the admissibility of
victim impact evidence, State v. Allen,26t was argued before the New Mexico
Supreme Court on the same day as Jacobs. In an interesting mix of events, Clark III
had not yet been decided1 2 and victim impact evidence was still inadmissible in
New Mexico while both cases were being argued. Allen reaffirmed the court's
holding in Clark III that victim impact evidence, "briefly and narrowly presented,"
is admissible because it is consistent with New Mexico's death penalty statute and
doesn't violate constitutional guarantees.263
Allen, 'however, addressed two issues not present in Clark III: whether the
Victims of Crime Act applied ex-post facto since it became effective after the
defendant's arrest, and whether a videotape depicting the victim prior to her death
and the victim character testimony of two witnesses was admissible victim impact
250. Id. at 133-34, 990 P.2d at 807.
251. Id. at 135, 990 P.2d at 809.
252. Justice Franchini, however, wrote a specially concurring opinion expressing his philosophical and
practical opposition to the death penalty. Although he agreed the CFSA was constitutional, he believed the public
policy behind it was truly flawed. Id. at 147, 990 P.2d at 821.
253. N.M. CONST. art II, § 24(A)(7).
254. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-4 (2000).
255. Clark lll, 128 N.M. at 136, 990 P.2d at 810.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. ld. at 135, 990 P.2d at 809.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 136, 990 P.2d at 810.
261. 128 N.M. 482, 994 P.2d 728 (2000).
262. Clark III was decided on July 8, 1999. Therefore, it was still undecided whether New Mexico would
choose to adopt Payne at the time Allen and Jacobs were argued.
263. Allen, 128 N.M. at 504, 994 P.2d at 749.
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evidence.2" Chief Justice Minzner reasoned that Payne and sections 31-20A-1(C)
and 31-20A-2(B), both of which were in effect prior to Allen's arrest, provided
constitutional and statutory authority for the admission of victim impact evidence.
265
Therefore, the effective date of the crime victim's rights laws did not affect the
admission of victim impact evidence in this case.2"
Emphasizing that the Rules of Evidence applied to victim impact evidence at
capital sentencing trials,267 the court concluded the witness testimony was limited
to evidence about the victim and the impact of the murder on the victim's family,
which was relevant to the jury's decision.268 Similarly, the videotape fell within the
permissible category of a "quick glimpse of the life the defendant chose to
extinguish. ' 269 Applying the Rule 403 balancing test, the court concluded that
"under these narrow circumstances"'27 the videotape was not unfairly prejudicial.27'
As for the testimony, it concluded that Payne allowed testimony about the
uniqueness of the victim because it had probative value in assessing "the specific
harm caused by the crime in question." Accordingly, evidence about the impact of
the crime, including last contacts, efforts to learn the fate of the victim, their
reactions to learning of the victim's death, and their efforts to cope with the loss was
admissible victim impact evidence.272 Since it was brief and narrowly presented, it
did not prejudice the defendant. 73
To summarize, it seems apparent that modem death penalty sentencing trials
focus on the aggravating circumstance of the crime in question and on
individualized assessments of the defendant, which are offered in mitigation, to
humanize the defendant. At least partially in response to a rising public outcry for
victim's rights in sentencing considerations, the United States Supreme Court
overruled itself in a near unprecedented contradiction to the principle of stare decisis
and narrowly held that some categories of victim impact evidence could be
admissible.274 Since that time, many states, including New Mexico, have chosen to
follow Payne, thereby permitting the admission of limited victim impact evidence
at sentencing in death penalty cases.275
264. Id.
265. Id. at 504, 994 P.2d at 750; but see Clark III, 128 N.M. at 135,990 P.2d at 809 (holding Section 31-20A-
2(B) "charges the jury to consider the crime" in order to decide the appropriate punishment, while Section 31-20A-
1(C) "permits the jury to hear additional evidence"). Therefore, the statutory authority of Section 31-20A-2(B) to
which Justice Minzner referred is limited to statutory authority for a jury to consider victim impact evidence as a
circumstance of the crime, not as statutory authority for the admission of that evidence. Statutory authority for its
admission is found in Section 31-20A-1(C), which expressly allows additional evidence about the circumstances
of the crime.
266. Allen, 128 N.M. at 504, 994 P.2d at 750.
267. Id. In particular, the court emphasized the relevance and the balancing of unfair prejudice.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 505, 994 P.2d at 751.
270. The videotape depicting a campground scene a few months before the victim's death lasted only three
minutes where victim, dressed in a jacket and blue jeans, was shown eating lunch and standing beside other
campers. She did not speak and there were no close-ups.
271. Allen, 128 N.M. at 505, 994 P.2d at 751.
272. Id. (citing United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1219-20 (1998)).
273. See id.
274. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830-33 (1991) (O'Connor, J. concurring).
275. Plaintiff-Appelee's Answer Brief at 58, State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 127 (2000) (No. 24,062)
(noting seventeen of twenty-two states have rejected Booth and Gathers; four of the five states that prohibit such
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Only one year before Jacobs was decided, the New Mexico Supreme Court held
victim impact evidence, brief in nature and narrow in scope, that related to the
characteristics of the victim or the circumstances of the crime was relevant to the
sentencing decision and therefore admissible at capital sentencing trials.276 If,
however, victim impact evidence is relevant, then under the Rules of Evidence its
probative value must be weighed against any risk of prejudice arising from such
testimony.2" Any evidence presented in death penalty cases is simultaneously
limited by section 31-20A-4(C)(3), which mandates the reversal of a death sentence
where it was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor."'
Jacobs is important as one in a trilogy of cases, along with Clark III and Allen,
that have established the ground floor for the admission or exclusion of victim
impact evidence in capital sentencing proceedings in New Mexico. While Clark III
and Allen hold that brief evidence about the victim and the impact of the crime on
the victim's family is admissible at sentencing, Jacobs is more indicative of the
court's general attitude toward victim impact evidence. Moreover, Jacobs is a
statement by the court about what type of evidence is admissible at capital
sentencing and what standard will be applied if evidence is improperly admitted.
Broadly read, Jacobs seems to hold that the prosecution may not arbitrarily
introduce'any non-statutory aggravating circumstance about the defendant at
sentencing, whether it be evidence about the defendant in general or victim impact
evidence in particular, except as provided in section 31-20A-1(C).
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
The majority and the dissent in Jacobs disagreed about the admissibility of the
subscription evidence. Justice Franchini, writing for the majority, concluded the
evidence was inadmissible for three reasons. First, it was not relevant as a
circumstance of the crime.279 Second, section 31-20A-2(B) did not provide statutory
authority for the admission of non-statutory aggravating evidence about the
defendant.' Third, evidence of defendant's lack of remorse was inadmissible
because the issue of remorse was not before the jury.2' Because the evidence was
not admissible and because its introduction created the mere "possibility" of
prejudice and arbitrariness in the sentencing decision, section 31-20A-4(C)(3)
required the court to vacate the death sentence and remand the case for a new
sentencing hearing. 2 2
Justice Serna, on the other hand, argued the subscription evidence was relevant
as a circumstance of the crime. 3 Moreover, he argued the subscription evidence
evidence do so on state statutory grounds, not on constitutional grounds).
276. Clark!l!, 128 N.M. 119, 134, 990 P.2d 793, 808 (1999).
277. Allen, 128 N.M. at 504, 994 P.2d at 750.
278. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C)(3) (1978).
279. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 468, 10 P.3d at 147.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 469, 10 P.3d at 148.
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was probative of future dangerousness' that was admissible under section 31-20A-
2(B) as evidence about the defendant25 and to rebut mitigating evidence about the
defendant's good character"' and his potential for rehabilitation. 287 Applying a Rule
403 balancing test, the dissent concluded the probative value of the subscription
testimony was not substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice, and
therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence. 88
This section will show how the majority opinion is consistent with both New
Mexico and federal death penalty jurisprudence. It will also discuss and refute the
arguments presented by the dissent. Further, it will illustrate how Jacobs is evidence
of the continuing tension over what is admissible or inadmissible evidence at capital
sentencing trials, which seems to have embroiled the court for nearly two decades
and which neither the state legislature nor the New Mexico Supreme Court seems
willing to resolve. This Comment will then offer a reasonable explanation of what
evidence is admissible or is not admissible at capital sentencing trials under the law
of New Mexico, in particular with respect to victim impact evidence, and how
Jacobs is consistent with that analysis. The Comment will then review future
implications for practicing attorneys and trial courts as a result of the Jacobs
opinion.
A. Relevancy of the Magazine Subscription Testimony as a Circumstance of the
Crime
Jacobs held victim impact testimony regarding a defendant's post-arrest behavior
against a victim's family was not relevant as a "circumstance of the crime." '89 The
court reasoned that unlike Clark III, where victim impact evidence was admissible
because it was additional information about the circumstances of the crime, the
subscription evidence fell outside the scope of admissible evidence; it failed to
inform the jury about the "specific harm caused by the crime in question." 29° Even
though Jacobs caused the harm, the harm was not caused by the crime in question.29" '
The dissent, on the other hand, argued the subscription testimony was relevant as
a circumstance of the crime to show the family' s efforts to cope with their grief and
as a negative reminder of the family's loss.29 Moreover, the evidence allowed the
jury to put the mother's grief in context: because the defendant sent the
subscriptions, they were particularly painful. Rather than being a crime separate
from the murder, the dissent argued the subscriptions were in effect a re-opening of
an old wound and directly related to the harm caused by the murder.293
284. Id. at 473, 10 P.3d at 152.
285. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 475, 10 P.3d 127, 150 (2000).
286. Id. at 473, 10 P.3d at 152.
287. Id at 474, 10 P.3d at 153.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 468, 10 P.3d at 147.
290. Id. at 467-68, 10 P.3d at 146-47 (finding the evidence went beyond what was admissible under Payne,
Clark IlI, or the CFSA).
291. State v. Jacobs, 124 N.M. 448, 467-68, 10 P.3d 127, 146-47 (2000).
292. Id. at 470, 10 P.3d at 149.
293. Id.
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Ultimately, however, three justices apparently found there was an insufficient
nexus between Jacobs's jailhouse actions and the crime in question for the
subscription evidence to qualify as a circumstance of the crime. Although the court
was silent on the matter, it could be argued that while the subscriptions might have
been neutral reminders in another setting, these particular subscriptions were the
product of the defendant's conduct nearly one year after the crime in question. In
fact, Jacobs's conduct might have constituted an altogether new crime.2' Rather
than expounding on its conclusion that the subscription evidence went beyond the
circumstances of the crime, however, the court simply found it did not describe the
specific harm caused by the crime in question.295
Two cases decided within one year of Jacobs discussed the admissibility of
victim impact testimony in New Mexico. As described above, Clark III involved
victim impact evidence that related to the circumstance of the crime, while Allen
primarily discussed evidence concerning the character of the victim. When Clark I
was decided, Booth was still controlling in New Mexico. Ten years later, the court
rejected that part of Booth that prohibited the admission of victim impact testimony
and evidence about the victim at capital sentencing trials in Clark III.
In Clark 1, the court held the mother's testimony concerning background family
information, a description of the last time she saw her daughter, and her efforts to
find the child did not constitute the type of victim impact evidence proscribed by
Booth.2 Rather, this evidence, the court held, was admissible under section 31-
20A-1(C) 297 to prove the aggravated circumstances of kidnapping and murder of a
witness, and because it was evidence directly related to the circumstances of the
crime, which was permissible even under Booth.29 Clark III held the mother's
testimony that she would never know what it was like to raise a daughter or enjoy
activities with her was the type of brief victim impact testimony permitted under
Payne.29
Allen, which was argued on the same day as Jacobs, was the second New Mexico
case to permit victim impact testimony under Payne. Factually, it offers little for the
purpose of comparison because, unlike Jacobs, the testimony focused on the
character of the victim.3
Jacobs is consistent with Clark III in that it limited victim impact testimony to
brief and narrowly presented evidence about the circumstance of the crime.
Although Jacobs offers little guidance for future cases, it does seem to be indicative
of the court's view with respect to victim impact evidence. Undoubtedly, the court
294. Defendant-Appeilant's Brief in Chief at 24, State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 127 (2000) (No.
24,062). On appeal, the defense pointed out that the prosecution itself had argued that Jacobs's actions actually
constituted a crime: harassing a witness. Although the state responded, it was uncertain what criminal statute
actually proscribed this behavior. Plaintiff-Appellee's Answer Brief at 65, State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d
127 (2000) (No. 24,062).
295. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 470, 10 P.3d at 149.
296. 108 N.M. 288, 299, 772 P.2d 322, 333 (1989).
297. id.
298. id. at 299, 772 P.2d at 333.
299. 128 N.M. 119. 135, 990 P.2d 793, 809 (1999).
300. State v. Allen, 128 N.M. 482, 50405, 994 P.2d, 728, 750-51 (2000) (holding testimony laying the
foundation for a videotaped depiction of the victim at a family camping trip where there were no close-ups and the
victim didn't speak and testimony about the victim's future plans was admissible under Payne).
Summer 2001 ]
NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW
intends to make such evidence admissible in its most narrow light.3"' Not only must
victim impact evidence be "brief and narrowly presented," under Jacobs it must be
directly and wholly related to the circumstances of the crime, which is very
reminiscent of the holding in Booth.302 In short, there must be a direct nexus between
the defendant's actions and the crime in question. It seems apparent under Jacobs
that while New Mexico will tolerate victim impact evidence at capital sentencing
trials, that evidence is only narrowly admissible and subject to strict ad hoc review.
Both the defense and the prosecution as well as the court arguments focused on
whether the subscription evidence was a "circumstance of the crime," which is
admissible under Payne, Clark, and Allen, as well as the CSFA. Whether the
subscription testimony was Type II evidence, which is still unconstitutional under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments according to Booth, never became an issue.
Type II victim impact evidence includes a victim's characterizations and opinions
about the defendant or the crime. At sentencing Paula Thomas testified,
[Karen Balderama] was devastated. I mean, here you've lost a child, and all of
a sudden somebody's playing a practical, ugly, cruel joke on you, and it wasjust
devastating to her. She just couldn't believe somebody would be that cruel to
her. And then she came in, and when she found out that they were coming from
Shawn Jacobs, she said, "Why does he keep hurting my family? What is
it?".. ."Why does he keep hurting me?"3 3
Like the testimony of the son who felt the defendants had butchered his parents
like animals or the daughter who testified that she didn't want him to hurt anyone
else, this testimony speaks to the witnesses' feelings about the defendant and about
their feelings concerning the crime itself. These statements were arguably
inadmissible under Booth and Payne. When arguing to include or exclude victim
impact evidence, attorneys should consider arguing against those types of victim
impact evidence that are still unconstitutional under Booth.
B. "Considering Both the Defendant and the Crime" under Section 31-20A-2(B)
Jacobs next held the subscription evidence was not admissible under section 3 1-
20A-2(B) as evidence about "the defendant and the crime.'" Section 31-20A-2(B)
instructs the jury that "after weighing the aggravating circumstances and the
mitigating circumstances, weighing them against each other, and considering both
the defendant and the crime, the jury or judge shall determine whether the defendant
301. If the court had chosen to adopt the dissent's broader interpretation of what constituted a "circumstance
of the crime," the subscription evidence would have been admissible under section 31-20A-I(C), although it would
have had to survive Rule 403 scrutiny. Instead, the court narrowly interpreted "circumstance of the crime" as only
"specific harm" caused by the crime in question.
302. Arguably, under South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), which extended the Booth rule to a
prosecutor's arguments at sentencing, a prosecutor may not argue victim opinion testimony about a defendant or
the appropriateness of the sentence to a sentencing jury either. This is so because Payne applied only to evidence
of victim impact or evidence about the victim, rather than opinion testimony regarding the defendant or the crime.
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830-33 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
303. Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 27, State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 127 (2000) (No.
24,062).
304. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 468, 10 P.3d 127, 147 (2000).
(Vol. 31
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment."3 5 That instruction, the court
held, is a weighing instruction, not an evidentiary statute like section 31-20A-I(C),
which expressly limits evidence beyond the statutory aggravating circumstances to
additional evidence about the circumstance of the crime or evidence that was
previously admitted during trial.306 Unfortunately, however, the opinion cited no
authority to support its finding nor did it offer any rationale, which leaves the ruling
on the matter open to attack and without clear future guidance.
Justice Serna, on the other hand, argued that section 31-20A-2(B) language
"considering both the defendant and the crime" authorized the admission of
evidence about the defendant, and therefore, the subscription testimony was relevant
to that inquiry as evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness.0 7 Otherwise,
the dissent reasoned, the court's previous rulings regarding the admissibility of
evidence about the defendant's future dangerousness in Clark H and Jacobs were
erroneous. In support of this premise, the dissent relied on United States Supreme
Court decisions as well as the intent of the New Mexico Legislature in enacting that
section .308
The fundamental opposition between these two opinions lies in an on-going
debate over what the legislature intended by including the language "considering
both the defendant and the crime" in section 31-20A-2(B). 309 The debate in Jacobs
arises over whether that language authorized the state to admit any evidence, apart
from the statutory aggravating factors, that was relevant to a defendant's character,
his attitude concerning the crime, and his behavior after arrest. From an evidentiary
standpoint then, Jacobs is critical in its holding that evidence is only admissible
under section 31-20A- 1(C), 310 because it necessarily follows that victim impact
evidence may not be used to arbitrarily introduce non-statutory aggravating
circumstances about the defendant at capital sentencing trials.
The Jacobs opinion is better understood, both from a philosophical and legal
standpoint, if Clark III and Allen are read as its companion cases. Justice Franchini' s
opinion in both cases appears to be rooted in his admittedly strong philosophical
beliefs against the death penalty, both morally and as a matter of policy, and his
express belief that victim impact evidence has no place in the selection process.31'
This conviction, he acknowledged, is pitted against his duty and responsibility as a
judge to interpret and apply the law.3t2 Conceding that the latter must prevail over
the former, Justice Franchini concurred with the decision in Clark 111313 that victim
305. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
306. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 468, 10 P.3d at 147.
307. Id. at 470-72, 10 P.3d at 149-50.
308. Id. at 472-74, 10 P.3d at 150-52.
309. For example, there is evidence of the court's concern over the language as early as State v. Garcia, 99
N.M. 771, 664 P.2d 969 (1983), which was the first case to rule on the constitutionality of the CFSA. Justice Sosa
argued for instructions to define the language and to inform the sentencing jury it was not to consider non-statutory
aggravating factors.
310. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at468, 10 P.3d at 147.
311. State v. Allen, 128 N.M. 482,520,994 P.2d 728,766 (2000); see also Clark i11, 128 N.M. 119, 147,990
P.2d 793, 821 (1999).
312. Clark 11, 128 N.M. at 147,990 P.2d at 821.
313. Id. (noting only that he was not convinced by the defendant's argument that the death penalty was
unconstitutional under New Mexico law).
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impact testimony was admissible under section 31-20A-1 (C) as additional evidence
about the circumstances of the crime.314
In Allen, Justice Franchini retreated from his concurrence in Clark III that victim
impact evidence was admissible under New Mexico law.315 Instead, he argued that
section 31-20A-2(B) "cabins" the capital sentencing jury's consideration to only
those aggravating circumstances that are listed and a nonexclusive list of mitigating
circumstances. 36 Although the CFSA does not require the jury to weigh the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the abstract, it does not allow a jury to
pick additional non-statutory aggravating factors about the defendant or the crime. 3 7
While a defendant's character and past history might be highly relevant and
important evidence in a capital sentencing trial,3 ' the New Mexico Legislature has
never determined that a non-statutory aggravating factor was a proper consideration
to impose the death penalty. 39 This is true even though it has had several
opportunities to amend the CFSA since the Victim's Rights Amendment was put
into effect in January of 1995. 32
Although Jacobs signals a retreat from Justice Franchini's extreme position in
Allen, the underlying arguments remain applicable, except for the fact that victim
impact evidence is admissible, as a unanimous court in Clark III agreed, under
section 31-20A-I(C) as a circumstance of the crime. It follows then that in Jacobs,
Justice Franchini wanted to ensure the use of victim impact evidence as a non-
statutory aggravating factor about the defendant, rather than as additional evidence
about the circumstances of the crime, was, as he said, "cabined" by section 31-20A-
1 (C). The majority of the Justices seem to have agreed that this was correct.
Beyond the statutory analysis in Allen set forth above, New Mexico precedent
also supports the court's opinion in Jacobs that section 31-20A-2(B) is a balancing
statute and not an evidentiary statute authorizing the admission of non-statutory,
aggravating circumstances about the defendant. As set forth above, New Mexico
enacted the CFSA and its corresponding jury instructions pursuant to the guidelines
established by Supreme Court decisions. 32' These guidelines established that a
state's death penalty scheme was constitutionally required to limit and direct
sentencing discretion but allow for an individualized assessment of the defendant
in mitigation of a sentence of death.322
Three years after its enactment, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the CFSA and its corresponding jury instructions in State v.
Garcia.323 There, the court declined an invitation to define the language,
314. Id. at 136, 990 P.2d at 810.
315. See Allen, 128 N.M. at 522,994 P.2d at 767.
316. Id. at 522, 994 P.2d at 767-68.
317. Id. at 522, 994 P.2d at 768.
318. Id. (arguing that the asymmetry created by identifying the lack of any significant history of prior criminal
activity as a mitigating factor, but excluding it from the list of aggravating factors, is not redressed by claiming a
defendant's prior crimes are relevant to the sentencing decision and admissible under section 31-20A-2(B)).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
322. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 143 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
323. 99 N.M. 771,664 P.2d 969 (1983).
[Vol. 31
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
"considering both the defendant and the crime," in objective terms.324 Instead, they
held that a subjective, individualized assessment of the defendant was required
under Lockett and Eddings2 Together, Lockett and Eddings hold that a defendant
must be allowed to present any relevant evidence in mitigation of a sentence of
death and that the sentencing authority may not refuse to consider any relevant
mitigating evidence."2 Instructing the jury that they may consider only "the
defendant and the crime" in mitigation of a defendant's sentence would arguably
restrict the rule under Lockett and its progeny that the court so clearly had adopted.
Although the Garcia court refused to restrict mitigating evidence as such, the
next year, the court rejected an argument that the instruction was unconstitutional
because it allowed the jury to consider any non-statutory aggravating factors about
the defendant.3 27 The court held the language, "considering both the defendant and
the crime," in "U.J.I. Crim. 39.33 [did] not allow the consideration of non-statutory
circumstances[,] rather it relate[d] to a weighing process, not to the threshold
determination of whether an aggravating circumstance exist[ed]."3
Taken together, one may reasonably conclude from these cases that the court in
Garcia refrained from defining the section 31-20A-2(B) language because it did not
want to preclude the jury from considering any mitigating circumstances about the
defendant. In Guzman, however, the court clearly stated this language related to a
weighing process and did not authorize the introduction of non-statutory aggravating
factors about the defendant. These two precedents, therefore, support Jacobs's
holding that section 31-20A-2(B) is a weighing statute, not an evidentiary statute
that allows a jury to consider additional, non-statutory evidence about the defendant,
such as evidence the defendant sent magazine subscriptions to the victim's family
after the murder.
The most contemporary analysis of this issue is found in Clark Ill and in Allen.
In Clark III, Justice Serna, writing for the majority, noted that sections 31-20A-2(B)
and 31-20A- 1(C) provided statutory authority for victim impact evidence at capital
sentencing trials because such evidence constituted additional evidence of the
circumstance of the crime.329 The court went on to explain however that "31-20A-
1(C) permitted the jury to hear additional evidence as to the circumstance of the
crime," while "31-20A-2(B) charged the jury to consider the circumstances of the
crime in order to decide the appropriate punishment. ' '330 Thus, even Clark III clearly
distinguished section 31-20A-1(C) as an evidentiary statute from section 31-20A-
2(B) as a weighing statute.
Nowhere does section 31-20A-1(C) authorize the admission of additional non-
statutory aggravating evidence about the defendant. Since it is not expressly
admissible under section 31-20A-1(C), it may not be considered under section 31-
324. Id. at 783, 664 P.2d at 981 (attacking the validity of the instruction, Justice Sosa argued the jury should
be instructed that only enumerated aggravating factors were to be considered, and that "the defendant and the crime"
may be considered only as factors to mitigate a sentence).
325. Id. at 779, 64 P.2d at 977.
326. See supra notes 144 to 146 and accompanying text.
327. State v. Guzman, 100 N.M. 756, 676 P.2d 1321 (1984).
328. Id. at 760, 676 P.2d at 1325.
329. Clark 11, 128 N.M. 119, 134, 990 P.2d 793,808 (1999).
330. Id. at 135, 990 P.2d at 809 (emphasis added).
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20A-2(B), unless it comes in as evidence admitted at trial, or as additional evidence
as to the circumstance of the crime or as to additional evidence to prove an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance as allowed under the CFSA.
On the other hand, any evidence concerning the circumstances of the crime is
always relevant both as an evidentiary matter and in weighing the evidence under
the CFSA.33 Moreover, the specific harm caused by the defendant as a circumstance
of the crime goes directly to the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness
at sentencing, which a jury is not precluded from hearing at sentencing.332 What is
important to note is that Clark III ultimately held victim impact evidence was
admissible under section 31-20A-1(C) as a circumstance of the crime.333 Allen
reaffirmed that holding.33
C. Future Dangerousness as a Non-Statutory Aggravating Factor
The dissent also argued the subscription testimony was evidence of future
dangerousness that traditionally has been allowed in death penalty sentencing
proceedings under both federal and New Mexico law.335 Justice Serna reasoned that
since evidence of future dangerousness is not admissible during the guilt phase and
it is not a circumstance of the crime or a statutory aggravating or mitigating
circumstance under section 31-20A-1 (C), the authority for its admission had to come
from section 31-20A-2(B). 336 From this, he deduced that if future dangerousness
were not admissible under that section, Clark v. Tansey 37 (hereinafter Clark II) and
Jacobs were wrongly decided. In support of an argument against that conclusion,
the dissent relied on Simons v. South Carolina,33" Tuilaepa v. California,339 Woodson
v. North Carolina,340 and Zant v. Stephens.34' Together, these cases, the dissent
argued, held that to pass constitutional muster and provide the fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, courts are required to make an
individualized assessment of the defendant. 342 To accomplish this task, both a
backward and forward looking inquiry regarding a defendant's character, prior
criminal history, mental capacity, background, age, and future dangerousness are
just a few of the many factors that become relevant at sentencing. 343 The arguments
of the dissent, at least in this writer's opinion, are misguided and inapposite to the
law in New Mexico.
First, the issue of future dangerousness in Clark 11 and the court's decision
regarding the joinder of the escape charge in Jacobs are distinguishable from the
331. Section 31-20A-1(C) expressly permits additional evidence about the circumstances of the crime and
section 31-20A-2(B) expressly permits the jury to consider that evidence.
332. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
333. Clark Iil, 128 N.M. at 136, 990 P.2d at 810.
334. State v. Allen, 128 N.M. 482, 504, 994 P.2d 728, 750 (2000).
335. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448,470-72, 10 P.3d 127, 149-51.
336. ld. at 471, 10P.3dat 150.
337. 118 N.M. 486, 882 P.2d 527 (1994).
338. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
339. 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
340. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
341. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
342. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448. 471-72, 10 P.3d 127, 150-51 (2000).
343. Id.
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facts of Jacobs regarding the subscription testimony. Clark 11 readdressed the issue
of whether a defendant was entitled to present mitigating evidence of his parole
ineligibility when future dangerousness was at issue.' Clark was arrested for the
kidnap, rape, and murder of a nine-year old girl while he was on release pending
appeal of a conviction for the kidnap and rape of a six-year old girl. 45 At sentencing,
the State was allowed to introduce evidence of this prior conviction for the limited
purpose of showing motive and purpose to prove a statutory aggravating
circumstance.3" Consequently, Clark's defense at sentencing focused on assuring
the jury he would not be a future danger if he received a life sentence. 347 In rebuttal,
the State pointed out all factors relevant to release after a conviction of a life
sentence.3 48 The court in Clark I had concluded the defendant was not entitled to
present evidence of his parole ineligibility in mitigation of a sentence of death.349
That decision in Clark I was reversed in Clark 11, which held that when a
prosecutor argues future dangerousness to secure a death sentence, the failure to
provide a jury with accurate information regarding parole ineligibility violates the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process right.3' In Clark I the court was
divided over whether parole ineligibility was a mitigating factor under the Eighth
Amendment but had never addressed any Fourteenth Amendment concerns.3"' The
court in Clark II, however, noted that the Supreme Court had held future
dangerousness was an appropriate consideration for capital sentencing juries so long
as the defendant was given the opportunity to rebut that evidence as required by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 352 The court concluded, therefore, that the Due Process
Clause required disclosure of any information regarding parole ineligibility in
mitigation of a sentence of death where the prosecution argued future
dangerousness. 353
Although Clark I1 could be cited as authority for the proposition that the
prosecution may argue future dangerousness at sentencing in certain circumstances,
it does not hold that the state is free to argue affirmative evidence of future
dangerousness that is not in response to claims against future dangerousness. Future
dangerousness was at issue in Clark I and Clark 1I because evidence of Clark's prior
conviction for a substantially similar crime was initially introduced by the state as
evidence to prove a statutory aggravating factor during the eligibility phase of
sentencing. 354 Although the jury was instructed to limit its consideration of that
factor, the jury was still free to consider the prior conviction for purposes of
344. 118 N.M. 486,491,882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994).
345. Clark1, 108 N.M. 288,290-91,772 P.2d 322, 324-25 (1989). In an attempt to get his sentence commuted
by then Governor Anaya, Clark pled guilty to all charges. Governor Anaya's term in ofrice, however, expired before
Clark's sentencing and the court refused to withdraw his plea. Id. at 291-92, 772 P.2d at 325-26.
346. Id. at 304, 772 P.2d at 338.
347. Id. at 295, 772 P.2d at 329.
348. Id. at 298, 772 P.2d at 332.
349. Id.
350. 118 N.M. 486,492, 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 492, 882 P.2d at 533.
353. Id.
354. Clark 1, 108 N.M. at 304, 772 P.2d at 338.
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sentencing under section 31-20A- 1 (C). 355 Therefore, the defense had no choice but
to rebut this evidence. As a result, much of the defense's argument at the selection
phase focused on the issue of future dangerousness to assure the jury that the
defendant would not be a future threat.3" 6 Once the issue was argued, the prosecution
vigorously tried to rebut defendant's claim.3"7 Clark 11 merely held that the
Fourteenth Amendment required that the defendant be allowed to introduce the
mitigating evidence of parole ineligibility to accomplish this task.3"8 It did not hold
the State is always entitled to argue future dangerousness.
The dissent also relied on the court's unanimous decision in Jacobs that evidence
of a defendant's escape from custody while awaiting trial was properly before the
jury at sentencing.359 Over defendant's objection, the trial court in Jacobs allowed
consolidation of the escape charge with the first degree murder and related charges
but gave a limiting instruction to the jury not to consider the escape evidence for any
purpose during the penalty phase.3W On appeal, Jacobs argued the jury at sentencing
had been prejudiced by evidence of the escape presented at trial.36' Under New
Mexico law, a defendant may be prejudiced by joinder if the evidence would
otherwise be inadmissible in separate trials. 2 The court concluded and the
defendant conceded evidence of escape is always relevant at trial to show
consciousness of guilt. 3 Therefore, the court concluded, the escape charge was
properly before the jury at sentencing as future dangerousness was an appropriate
consideration at sentencing, so long as the defendant is afforded the .opportunity for
rebuttal.3"
Jacobs simply held that a capital sentencing jury is not forbidden to hear evidence
of future dangerousness if it is properly before them. Like Clark H, it does not hold
that affirmative evidence of future dangerousness is admissible at sentencing when
it is not in response to a claim of future dangerousness. Although the court has held
the defendant must be given an opportunity for rebuttal when a prosecutor urges a
sentence of death,65 it has never held that the prosecution has the discretion to
introduce any extrinsic evidence to prove their argument. Even if the state can raise
the general specter of future dangerousness in argument, 3" it appears to be an open
question whether it can present affirmative evidence of future dangerousness when
the issue has not been raised at trial, or to prove a statutory aggravating factor, or in
355. As noted above, this statute expressly allows the jury to consider additional evidence admitted to prove
enumerated aggravating circumstance.
356. Clark I, 108 N.M. at 297, 772 P.2d at 331.
357. Id. at 304, 772 P.2d at 337.
358. Clark II, 118 N.M. 486,492, 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994).
359. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 457, 10 P.3d, 127, 136 (2000).
360. Id. at456, 10 P.3d at 135.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at457, 10 P.3d at 136.
365. Clark 1I, 118 N.M. 486, 492, 882 P.2d 527,534 (1994).
366. In State v. Compton, the court held that the prosecutor's comment to jury not to "give this man the
chance to hurt someone else" was proper argument. 104 N.M. 683,686,726 P.2d 837, 840 (1986). "[Its effect was
merely to point out to the jury the future dangerousness of this particular defendant." Id. at 691,726 P.2d at 845.
[Vol. 31
VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
response to mitigating evidence proffered by the defense. Neither Clark It nor
Jacobs answer that question.
Unlike Clark I and Clark H, where both the defense and prosecution argued
future dangerousness extensively at sentencing, in Jacobs neither the defense nor the
prosecution ever raised the issue of future dangerousness at trial or sentencing with
respect to the magazine subscription testimony.367 Because it was not before the
court, the majority apparently did not feel compelled to address the issue. In fact, no
New Mexico case has ever held extrinsic, non-statutory aggravating factors about
the defendant can be considered.3 Rather, as Clark 11 pointed out, the Constitution
compels the court to allow any relevant mitigating evidence about the defendant
when the prosecution argues future dangerousness, including accurate information
about the defendant's parole ineligibility.369
Moreover, in Jacobs the escape evidence was before the sentencing jury only
because it had been admitted at trial. The subscription testimony, on the other hand,
was not admitted at trial and therefore not properly before the sentencing jury. As
stated above, neither the defense nor the State chose to argue future dangerousness
with respect to the subscription evidence.
Clark I1 and Jacobs should be construed to allow the admission of evidence of
future dangerousness at capital sentencing trials in only limited circumstances.
Neither case relied on the authority of section 31-20A-2(B) for the admission of
evidence about the defendant. Rather, under the facts of either case, future
dangerousness came in at sentencing because the evidence was admissible to prove
a statutory aggravating circumstance at the sentencing-eligibility phase in Clark II
and to prove consciousness of guilt at the guilt-innocence phase in Jacobs. Neither
case held the state could arbitrarily introduce that evidence at sentencing. This
conclusion is consistent with section 31-20A-I(C), which provides any evidence
admitted at trial or additional evidence as to the circumstance of the crime or to
prove any aggravating or mitigating circumstance is admissible at capital sentencing
proceedings. The dissent's reliance on Clark I1 in support of its proposition that
section 31-20A-2(B) must provide statutory authority for the introduction of
evidence about the defendant's future dangerousness is therefore misguided. Rather,
section 31-20A-I(C) provides authority for the introduction of that evidence, as well
as other non-statutory aggravating evidence about the defendant, but only under
those circumstances enumerated in the CFSA.
Federal precedent was cited by the dissent to support the proposition that future
dangerousness was admissible in the State's case in chief at capital sentencing under
367. Although the State raised an inference of future dangerousness with respect to the escape charge, neither
side appeared to have argued this to the jury at sentencing or raised it on appeal. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief
in Chief; Plaintiff-Appellee's Answer Brief; Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief; State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 10
P.3d 127 (2000) (Docket No. 24062).
368. In Clark i, the court considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances of Clark's background, his
crime, and his prior conviction for a substantially similar crime. It found federal law had approved the consideration
of "all relevant aspects of the defendant's character, as well as the crime itself' in deciding whether to impose the
death penalty and was therefore properly before the jury for its consideration. 108 N.M. 288, 308, 772 P.2d 322,
342. This holding, however, is not inconsistent with section 31-20A-1(C), which permitted the admission of non-
statutory aggravating factors under the limited situations that applied to Clark L
369. Clark H, 118 N.M. 486, 492, 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994).
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section 31-20A-2(B), as evidence about the defendant.370 These cases, Simons v.
South Carolina37' and Tuilaepa v. California,372 the dissent argued, held that
aggravating factors about the defendant, including future dangerousness, are
admissible at capital sentencing trials even without express statutory authority.
373
Simmons and Tuilaepa, as well as the cases cited therein, however, are inapposite
to Jacobs and the law in New Mexico. They merely support the conclusion that the
Constitution does not forbid consideration of future dangerousness at capital
sentencing trials, if a state so chooses. In other words, the Court's decision to defer
to the states, a policy decision to include future dangerousness as a substantive,
statutory aggravating factor, or even as a non-statutory aggravating factor, does not
speak to whether in fact the state has accepted that choice.
Tuilaepa represents a line of cases that have upheld a state's policy decision to
designate future dangerousness as a substantive factor as a matter of statutory law.374
In Tuilaepa, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a California capital
sentencing scheme. Under California law, defendants were eligible for the death
penalty if they were convicted of first-degree murder and the jury found one or more
aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute.3" In order to make an
individualized assessment and fix the appropriate punishment, the jury next
considered numerous other factors listed in the statute, 376 which were neither
characterized as mitigating or aggravating circumstances.377 In particular, the
defendant challenged a factor that required the jury to consider the presence or
absence of criminal activity by the defendant.37 The Court reasoned that sentencing
schemes, which required the jury to consider the defendant's future dangerousness,
had been upheld as constitutional. 379 Accordingly, the Court held a state could
require the jury to consider the presence or absence of criminal activity, stating
"both a backward-looking and a forward-looking inquiry were a permissible part of
the sentencing process.. .and that states have considerable latitude in determining
how to guide the sentencer's decision.
30
Simmons, on the other hand, is representative of a line of cases where the Court
has upheld a state's decision to permit the use of non-statutory aggravating factors
to enter the sentencing decision.38' In Simmons, unlike Jacobs, the defendant put
370. Jacobs at 471, 10 P.3d at 150.
371. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
372. 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
373. Id.
374. See e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,272-76 (1976) (holding the Constitution did not forbid states from
choosing to include consideration of future dangerousness at capital sentencing under its statutory scheme); see also
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013 (1983) (holding that instructing the jury that the Governor could commute
a death sentence did not violate the substantive limits of the Constitution, and beyond that, states could choose the
substantive factors to present to the sentencing jury).
375. Tuilepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (1994).
376. Id. at 975.
377. Id. at 981 (Stevens, J., concurring).
378. Id. at 976.
379. Id. at 976-77.
380. Id. at 977.
381. See e.g., Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 957-58 (1983) (noting there was "no constitutional defect
in a sentence based on both statutory and non-statutory aggravating circumstances," in that "mere errors of state
law are not the concern of this Court," and concluding the Florida Supreme Court could decide whether the
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future dangerousness at issue by introducing mitigating evidence that tended to
show the defendant's violent behavior was the product of a serious mental disorder,
which stemmed from years of abuse and neglect. Because of the mental disorder,
both the defendant and the State agreed that the defendant posed a continuing danger
to elderly women." 2 The State raised a "generalized specter" of future
dangerousness in closing argument, which the defense tried to rebut, in part, by
proffering jury instructions defining "life imprisonment" as "parole ineligible., 38 3
Nonetheless, the trial court precluded the defense from introducing the instruction,
and later instructed the jury not to consider parole eligibility at all.384
The Court acknowledged that even though the South Carolina statutes did not
require the jury to consider future dangerousness, the states evidence in aggravation
was not limited to statutory aggravating circumstances. 385 The issue before the
Court, however, was not whether a non-statutory aggravating factor such as future
dangerousness was admissible under state law, but whether the court could refuse
the defendant an opportunity to rebut the issue.380 The Court emphatically rejected
that and held that "where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state
law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the
sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible." Reaffirming the
principle that "sending a man to death on the basis of information which he had no
opportunity to deny or explain violated fundamental notions of due process, 3 7 the
Court reversed the trial court's decision. 8
Together, Simmons and Tuilaepa and the cases cited therein hold that, beyond
some minimal standards required by the Constitution, 9 states have wide discretion
to choose what substantive factors they permit the sentencing authority to consider
in making an individualized assessment of the defendant, including evidence of a
defendant's future dangerousness. 39° Neither Simmons nor Tuilaepa nor the cases
cited therein, however, stand for the proposition that the court is required to let the
prosecution arbitrarily introduce non-statutory aggravating factors about the
defendant at sentencing. Instead, they hold that aggravating factors about a
defendant, such as future dangerousness, may be considered at sentencing if a state
elimination of improperly considered aggravating circumstances could not possibly affect the sentencing decision).
382. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 157.
383. Id at 157-58. The Court treated the instruction, advising the jury that a life sentence meant the defendant
was parole ineligible, as mitigating evidence.
384. Id. at 160.
385. Id. at 162.
386. Id. at 156.
387. Id. at 164 (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) and Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977)). In Skipper, the court held that, under the Due Process Clause, a defendant must be given the opportunity
to present mitigating evidence about his good behavior in prison while awaiting trial to rebut the prosecutions
prediction of future dangerousness. 476 U.S. at5, n. 1. In Gardner, the Court held the failure to present the defendant
with an opportunity to rebut a pre-sentence report violated due process. 430 U.S. at 362.
388. Id at 171.
389. The Supreme Court has articulated only three substantive limits placed on a state's capital sentencing
scheme by the Constitution. First, it proscribes excessively vague standards that lead to arbitrary or capricious
decisions. Second, it precludes the sentencer from refusing to hear any mitigating factors. Third, it requires the
defendant be afforded an opportunity to explain or deny any proffered evidence. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,
1000-01 (1983). Beyond that, courts should defer policy decisions on the substantive factors that a state chooses
to consider in imposing the death penalty to the states. Id. at 1003.
390. See supra notes 374 & 382 and accompanying text.
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chooses to make them relevant under its death penalty laws or under its common
law.39 Although, South Carolina or any other state may allow non-statutory
aggravating factors, and the Constitution does not forbid this practice, -it does not
mean that New Mexico has chosen to follow that course.
Unlike New Mexico's capital sentencing scheme, the scheme in California under
consideration in Tuilaepa identified factors for the jury to consider but did not
designate them as aggravating or mitigating.392 Similarly, the scheme in Texas, that
was under consideration in Jurek v. Texas and which was cited to in Tuilaepa,39 3
expressly required the jury, at the selection phase, to consider the defendant's future
dangerousness. 394 Whereas, New Mexico's capital sentencing scheme does not
identify future dangerousness as a special circumstance and other evidence, such as
a defendant's criminal history, age, and potential for rehabilitation, is expressly
limited to factors in mitigation of a sentence of death. 395 Although the Supreme
Court has approved statutory schemes that permit consideration of those factors in
aggravation of a death sentence, the New Mexico Legislature has not chosen to
adopt them. Therefore, citing Tuilaepa, which has a substantially different statutory
scheme to support the proposition that future dangerousness is also admissible under
New Mexico State law, is of little relevance.
Recognizing states can choose to allow non-statutory evidence about a defendant
in aggravation of a death sentence does not necessarily support the proposition put
forth by the dissent that the subscription testimony was admissible as evidence of
Jacobs's future dangerousness, even without express statutory authority.396 Even
though the Court in Simmons noted that a state could introduce non-statutory,
aggravating factors about the defendant, including future dangerousness, 397 it did not
hold states must permit those factors at capital sentencing trials. The Court merely
held that the Constitution generally does not forbid such practice.398
Moreover, the legitimacy of the non-statutory aggravating factor of future
dangerousness was not at issue in Simmons.399 Presumably, the parties had conceded
that, at least under the common law of South Carolina, evidence of a defendant's
future dangerousness was admissible at capital sentencing trials. The Court
391. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
392. Tuilaepa and Ramos upheld a California sentencing scheme that required the jury, after finding a
defendant guilty, to find one of nineteen aggravating circumstances in the eligibility phase of sentencing. During
the punishment phase, however, the statute allowed the jury to have all information regarding the defendant and
did not characterize those factors as either mitigating or aggravating. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 975-
76, 981 (1994).
393. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 976-77.
394. Jurek upheld a Texas capital sentencing scheme that required a jury, after finding a defendant guilty of
one of five categories of murder, to answer three statutory questions, the second of which required the jury to
consider future dangerousness. The death penalty was imposed if each question was answered affirmatively. Even
though the Texas statute did not identify specific mitigating factors, the Court upheld the statute because Texas
courts had traditionally allowed the introduction of mitigating factors in consideration of defendant's future
dangerousness, and the Constitution did not forbid states from choosing to include future dangerousness at
sentencing. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272-76 (1976).
395. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6 (2000).
396. See State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448,471, 10 P.3d 127, 150 (2000).
397. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162 (1994) (plurality opinion).
398. See id. at 162; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-51 (1983) (plurality opinion).
399. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156.
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acknowledged that states were permitted to consider non-statutory aggravating
factors as a matter of federal law. The Court's focus, however, was the defendant's
fundamental right to have the opportunity to deny or explain evidence.' Taken in
context then, the case does little to bolster the dissent's position, except to say
federal law generally does not preclude a state from choosing to allow even non-
statutory aggravating factors at capital sentencing trials.
That a state is not precluded from deciding whether a non-statutory aggravating
factor will be permitted at capital sentencing was stated by the Court more clearly
in Barclay v. Florida,4°1 which was cited by the court in Simmons. 2 Nonetheless,
it never held that a state is required to admit such evidence. In Barclay the judge
overrode the jury's verdict of life and imposed the death penalty. The judge's
decision was based on the defendant's criminal history and the fact that no
mitigating circumstances existed. 3 Even though Florida law clearly established that
consideration of aggravating factors was limited to enumerated factors, and that
those factors did not include a defendant's criminal history, 4°4 the Court reasoned
the state's common law had developed a system to determine the effect of an
improper factor at capital sentencing hearings. 5 If some mitigating factors had been
found, cases were usually remanded for resentencing. If no mitigating factors had
been found, a harmless error test was applied and reversal was not necessarily
required.' In tacit approval of this system, the Court concluded there was no reason
why the Florida Supreme Court could not examine the balance struck by the judge
and decide if the elimination of a non-statutory aggravator could not "possibly"
affect that balance. °7 Accordingly, the Court held the judge's findings were not so
arbitrary or unprincipled as to violate the Constitution."
The Florida statute, like the CFSA, enumerated an exclusive list of aggravating
factors, which is more protection than required by the Constitution. 4' Although the
Court noted that a decision to impose the death penalty could never rest on non-
statutory factors, it concluded the Constitution did not prohibit non-statutory
evidence that was relevant to the defendant's character.10 Unlike Florida, however,
New Mexico has not developed a body of common law to review the arbitrary
introduction of non-statutory aggravating circumstances at sentencing, except as
provided under section 31-20A-4(C)(3), which mandates reversal.4 t'
Moreover, in Florida, unlike New Mexico, the jury's decision is only advisory
and the trial judge determines the actual sentence.42 The factors a judge chooses to
400. Id. at 164.
401. 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion).
402. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 162.
403. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 947.
404. Id. at 953, n.11.
405. Id. at 954-55.
406. Id.at 955.
407. Id. at 958.
408. Id. at 947.
409. Id. at 966-67 (Stevens, J., concurring).
410. Id.
411. In fact, this is precisely what Jacobs did with the subscription evidence.
412. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 952. In New Mexico, either a jury or judge makes the decision to impose the death
penalty, which is then automatically appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
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consider in his or her discretion and the factors the prosecution decides to offer a
jury in its discretion are two completely different things. Giving the prosecution
unbridled discretion to introduce non-statutory aggravating evidence about the
defendant would violate the fundamental principles of death penalty jurisprudence
that require sentencing schemes to be directed and limited so a decision to impose
the death penalty is based on reason rather than emotion or caprice.
Finally, the Jacobs dissent relied on Woodson v. North Carolina4 3 and Zant v.
Stephens4 4 to support its argument that an individualized assessment that included
future dangerousness, as well as all other relevant information about the defendant,
was required under the Constitution.4 " This argument is also flawed. As set forth
above, Woodson stands for the principle that a particularized consideration of the
relevant aspects of the character and record of the defendant before the imposition
of the sentence is an "enlightened policy" rather than a constitutional imperative. 416
Moreover, "individualized assessment" was a concept developed out of a
"fundamental respect" for the humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment; "A
process that accords no significance to relevant facts of the character and record of
the individual offender or circumstance of the crime excludes from consideration in
fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or
mitigating factors stemming from diverse frailties of humankind."'"7 The Court
institutionalized this principle in Lockett, holding a sentencing body may not be
precluded from hearing mitigating factors about the defendant and the crime."' 8
Neither Woodson nor Lockett nor its progeny have ever discussed this principle in
terms of aggravating circumstances about the defendant.
Although the Supreme Court has approved a state's decision to permit the
introduction of non-statutory aggravating factors at sentencing, any decision by the
state to permit this evidence should be carefully reviewed and restricted by the court
to prevent an arbitrary decision based on emotion rather than reason.4 9 When a state
decides the court may rely on non-statutory aggravators, it violates a defendant's
legitimate expectation that a state created protection cannot be arbitrarily
abrogated.4 Moreover, it undermines the principle underlying Lockett, Edding, and
Hitchcock that punishment should be directly related to a defendant's personal
culpability.
In this regard, Justice O'Connor's comment is instructive,
Evidence about a defendant's background and character is relevant because of
the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts
that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental
problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such
413. 428 U.S. 280(1976).
414. 462 U.S. 242 (1983).
415. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 471-72, 10 P.3d 127, 150-51 (2000).
416. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion).
417. Id. at 303.
418. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
419. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 954-56 (1983) (holding Florida's statutory scheme and common
law provided sufficient checks on the harmless error analysis).
420. Id. at 985-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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excuse .... Thus the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a
reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime."'
Indeed, Gregg and its progeny have held sentencing discretion must be directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. 22
The Court in Zant noted that "statutory aggravating circumstances play a
constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition; they
circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. 42 3 Accordingly,
Zant held the Constitution does not prevent the jury from considering other
aggravating factors; however, a state is also free to decide, as a matter of law, to
limit evidence to statutory aggravating circumstances.
4 24
New Mexico's death penalty statute enumerates an exclusive list of statutory
aggravators. As the court held in Guzman and as Justice Franchini pointed out in
Allen, section 31-20A-2(B) only requires the jury to consider enumerated
aggravating circumstances, whereas a jury must consider "other mitigating
circumstances" wholly apart from those enumerated within the statute."2
Zant made clear that it is a policy decision for the state whether to limit evidence
to enumerated aggravating circumstances.'2 New Mexico has chosen to limit
aggravating circumstances to those circumstances enumerated in its CFSA. The
language in section 31-20A-2(B), "considering defendant and the crime," is not
mere surplusage. Rather, the statute permits the sentencing authority to consider
factors beyond those enumerated in the CFSA once an aggravating circumstance has
been found. Neither the CFSA nor New Mexico precedent, however, grants the
prosecution unbridled, arbitrary discretion to introduce non-statutory aggravating
factors, such as the subscription evidence in Jacobs. Instead, the jury is free to
consider all relevant factors about the defendant based on evidence introduced at
trial, evidence introduced to prove an aggravating factor, or evidence introduced to
rebut mitigating evidence offered by the defendant.
4 27
D. Legislative Intent Regarding "Considering the Defendant and the Crime"
Justice Sema also argued the jury must consider any and all relevant information
about the defendant to effectuate the intent of the legislature in enacting section 31-
20A-2(B). 421 He argued consideration of relevant information about the defendant
had been a concern in both capital sentencing and traditional sentencing
421. Franklin v. Lyaaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
422. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
423. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).
424. Id.
425. State v. Guzman, 100 N.M. 756,760, 676 P.2d 1321, 1325 (1984); State v. Allen, 128 N.M. 482, 521,
994 P.2d 728, 767 (2000).
426. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 886-87 (1983) (noting that Georgia chose "not to impose
unnecessary restrictions on evidence that could be heard at sentencing and to approve open and far ranging
argument"). It is important to consider, however, that under Georgia law, unlike New Mexico law, the statute
provides the sentencing authority "shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of
punishment." Georgia's statute is ostensibly much broader than New Mexico's statute.
427. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1(C) (2000).
428. State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 172, 10 P.3d 127, 151 (2000).
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proceedings.429 Since the legislature was aware of these traditional sentencing
concerns and the defendant's constitutional right to present character evidence, he
concluded it had these considerations in mind when it drafted the instruction to
consider both the defendant and the crime.43° Moreover, if the statute did not permit
the prosecution to introduce evidence about the defendant, an instruction to consider
both the defendant and the crime would be mere surplusage.43
At the time the CFSA was drafted and enacted, Gregg, Lockett, and Woodson had
only recently been decided. As set forth above, those cases require states to draft
capital sentencing schemes to direct and limit sentencing discretion in categorizing
the class of defendants who are eligible for the death penalty. Schemes are required
to also ensure the selection of those defendants is made on an individualized basis
that did not preclude evidence in mitigation of any sentence of death. When the
CFSA was enacted, no case had ever held that the admission of non-statutory
aggravating factors at sentencing was proper. It is therefore reasonable to conclude
the legislature intended to draft a capital sentencing scheme that would comply with
the then-current law of the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, if the legislature
had intended to permit the jury to hear additional evidence about the defendant, it
could have drafted a statute like Texas or California that expressly allowed these
considerations. It did not, however, expressly permit consideration of other
aggravating circumstances about the defendant then, nor has it ever done so since.
There was also a general consensus that traditional sentencing considerations
were inappropriate in death penalty cases at the time the CFSA was enacted. The
underlying principle in modern death penalty cases that prompted the Court to
establish specific guidelines for imposing the death penalty was that death is a
penalty unlike any other punishment.432 The mere fact that aggravating factors have
been traditional sentencing concerns is itself irrelevant in death penalty sentencing
decisions. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude the legislature recognized this
principle in drafting the CFSA,433 and instead of making traditional aggravating
factors a consideration, chose to limit what the jury could consider in aggravation
of the death penalty to those factors enumerated in the CFSA.
As stated above, "considering the defendant and the crime" does not become
mere surplusage if the court declines to allow non-statutory aggravating factors
about the defendant under section 31-20A-2(B). Under section 31-20A-1(C), the
jury may consider additional evidence about the defendant, so long as it is limited
to evidence that was admitted at trial, offered to prove an enumerated aggravating
circumstance, or to rebut any mitigating circumstances raised by the defense.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.); see also, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509, n. 12 (1987), Clark II, 118 N.M. 486, 490, 882 P.2d
527, 531 (1994).
433. See State ex rel Human Servs. Dep't (In re Kiram), 118 N.M. 563, 569, 883 P.2d 149, 155 (1994)
(presuming the legislature is aware of existing law when it enacts legislation.).
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E. Subscription Testimony as Probative of Defendant's Lack of Remorse
The majority properly rejected the State's argument that the subscription
testimony was evidence of the defendant's lack of remorse. The court reasoned that
unlike Allen, which upheld the state's closing argument as rebuttal to the
defendant's testimony that he was remorseful, Jacobs never testified he was
remorseful, nor did he argue remorse in closing.434 This holding is consistent with
New Mexico law and supports the above analysis that evidence of aggravating
circumstances about the defendant is proper when offered as rebuttal to a
defendant's mitigating evidence.
F. Subscription Testimony as Evidence in Rebuttal to the Possibility of
Rehabilitation
The dissent argued the subscription testimony was also relevant to rebut
defendant's inference that he was amenable to rehabilitation.43 The defense had
argued Jacobs was a "sweet little boy" who, when punished, "invented a place
where he was king" and "in control of everything," and that he was not "beyond
redemption." '436 In fact, his actions "[were] those of a young man who is still seeking
redemption." '437 Although rebuttal evidence would have been admissible under the
rules of evidence and New Mexico common law, the fact remained that the
subscription evidence was not admitted in rebuttal. The subscription evidence was
admitted in the State's case-in-chief before the defense raised any inference about
rehabilitation during closing statement. In fact, the first time the State raised this
issue on appeal was in their motion for rehearing.43 There, the State argued that
presenting the subscription evidence before the defense's case-in-chief was harmless
error, and that there was nothing in the CFSA that suggested the State had to wait
for rebuttal to address issues the jury was required by law to consider. Jacobs
implicitly rejected this argument.
G. Courts Review under Section 31-20A-4(C)(3) and the Rules of Evidence
The majority concluded that the magazine subscription evidence created the
"possibility" the jury imposed the death sentence under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or other arbitrary factor.439 Therefore, section 31-20A-4(C)(3) required
the court to reverse the sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing
hearing."' The dissent, on the other hand, argued the proper analysis was under Rule
11-403. Even though the evidence was prejudicial, it reasoned any prejudice it
created did not significantly outweigh its probative value."' Therefore, the dissent
434. Jacobs at 468, 10 P.3d at 147.
435. Id. at472, 10P.3d at 153.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. See Plaintiff-Appellee's Answer Brief at 7-8, State v. Jacobs, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 127 (2000) (No.
24,062).
439. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 468, 10 P.3d at 147.
440. Id.
441. As discussed above, the dissent argued the magazine subscription evidence was highly probative of the
defendant's future dangerousness and as rebuttal to the defense's character evidence and argument that Jacobs was
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concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the evidence was properly
admitted." 2
The difference between these two conclusions appears to lie in the fundamental
disparity in the court's opinion as to the relevancy of the evidence. The majority
seems to have concluded that the evidence was not relevant to the sentencing
decision or admissible under section 31-20A-1(C), and therefore the subscription
testimony introduced arbitrary, non-statutory aggravating evidence about the
defendant's character into the sentencing decision." 3 The dissent, however, found
the evidence was relevant and properly admitted under section 31-20A-2(B). '
Therefore, it applied the rule 403 balancing test and concluded that any prejudice
presented by the magazine subscription evidence was substantially outweighed by
its probative value." '
As described above, Florida has a similar sentencing scheme as New Mexico.
Florida, however, has developed a different common law system for dealing with
cases where the jury has considered an improper aggravating factor." 6 In Barclay,
the Supreme Court upheld the Florida court's harmless error approach." 7 It found
no reason why a state's supreme court could not examine the balance struck by the
trial judge and decide if the elimination of the non-statutory aggravator could not
possibly affect the balance." 8
Although New Mexico has not developed a harmless error approach under its
common law like Florida, under Barclay, courts are free to determine whether the
introduction of a non-statutory factor affects the balance of statutory aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, and if so, to determine the appropriate remedy. This
is precisely what the majority did in Jacobs when it concluded the magazine
subscription evidence created the mere "possibility" that the jury imposed the death
sentence under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor." 9 On
the other hand, since the Rules of Evidence apply at capital sentencing trials,450 it is
reasonable to conclude that if the court had found the evidence was properly
admitted under section 31-20A- 1(C), an analysis under Rule 11-403 balancing test
would have been appropriate. As argued above, the subscription evidence was not
properly admitted evidence concerning the circumstances of the crime or as
evidence that had been admitted during the guilt-innocence phase or as evidence to
prove an aggravating circumstance or as evidence in rebuttal. Accordingly, the court
properly reversed and remanded the case for resentencing.
amenable to rehabilitation.
442. Id. at 468, 10 P.3d at 153.
443. See id. at 468, 10 P.3d at 147.
444. See id. at 469-70, 10 P.3d at 148-50.
445. Id. at 474, 10 P.3d at 153.
446. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 955 (1983).
447. Id. at 954-55.
448. Id. at 958.
449. Jacobs, 129 N.M. at 468, 10 P.3d at 147.
450. State v. Allen, 128 N.M. 482, 504, 994 P.2d 728, 750 (2000).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Capital Felony Sentencing Act was enacted in 1979 during a period in which
the Supreme Court had rejected a system of mandatory death sentences, as well as
a system that gave the jury unbridled discretion in imposing the death penalty.
Instead, the Court held the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required states to
implement a system that favored a rational process and individualized assessment
of the defendant in mitigation of a sentence of death. Over two decades later, the
New Mexico Supreme Court remains divided over what the legislature intended
when it enacted section 31-20A-2(B), which instructs the jury to "consider the
defendant and the crime." As a result, New Mexico courts and practicing attorneys
remain confused as to what is admissible evidence about the defendant once an
aggravating circumstance is found. This problem has been exacerbated by the recent
introduction of victim impact evidence, which was never expressly permitted under
the CFSA. Rather, the CFSA was retrofit to accommodate the use of that evidence
at capital sentencing proceedings.
The court's opinion in Jacobs provides only limited guidance to lower courts and
practicing attorneys. If anything, the opinion seems to confuse this issue, rather than
clarify it. Nonetheless, what is clear is that the New Mexico Supreme Court will
only tolerate brief and limited victim impact testimony that is directly relevant to the
circumstances of the crime. Non-statutory aggravating evidence about the defendant
is not admissible, except under the limited circumstances enumerated in section 31-
20A-I(C). In short, it appears any additional information about the defendant,
whether it is victim impact testimony or otherwise, is strictly limited to evidence
admitted at trial or additional evidence offered to prove an enumerated aggravating
factor or to rebut mitigating evidence presented by the defendant. The court simply
will not tolerate the introduction of any other non-statutory aggravating evidence
about the defendant. If the evidence falls outside these guidelines, section 31-20A-
1(4)(C)(3) will most likely be applied and the sentencing decision reversed and
remanded. If the evidence falls within these guidelines, on the other hand, the court
will most likely apply a Rule 11-403 balance test to determine whether the potential
for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
For victim rights advocates, practicing attorneys, and trial courts, this means that
unless the New Mexico Legislature amends the CFSA by enumerating a list of
aggravating factors that the jury may consider at the selection phase, Jacobs has
tightened the reins on non-statutory aggravating evidence a jury can hear in New
Mexico.
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